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I. INTRODUCTION
Some twenty years after its appearance, the Coase theorem"
remains a controversial proposition.2 The conventional wisdom is
that the theorem is controversial because it is necessarily associ-
I. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcON. 1 (1960).
2. The theorem has been attacked (1) as being a carrier of conservative political
dogma, see, e.g., Horwitz, Law and Economics: Science or Politics?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 905,
906-10 (1980) (theorem as "brilliant counterattack" to liberal interventionist movement):
Kelman, Spitzer and Hoffman on Coase: A Brief Rejoinder: 53 S. CAL L. REv. 1215, 1220-22
(1980) Ihereinafter A Brief RejoinderI (theorem as supporter of commodity form): Kelman,
Consumption Theory, Production Theory, and Ideology in the Coase Theorem, 52 S. CAL L. REV.
669, 673-78 (1979) [hereinafter Ideology in the Coase Theorem] (theorem as tool of Chicago
school of law and economics: (2) as morally and philosophically unacceptable, see, e.g., C.
FRIED, RIGTr AND WRON; 81-107 (1978) (theorem diminishes concept of person): Tribe,
Technology Assessment and the Fourth Discontinuity: The Limits of Instrumental Rationality, 46 S.
CA. L. RF:v. 617, 628-30 (1973) (reductionist tendency of theorem overlooks structural
complexity implicit in assignment of rights): (3) as politically incomplete, see, e.g., Kennedy,
Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REv. 387 (1981) (theo-
rem's use of efficiency standard requires numerous political decisions); and (4) as an incom-
plete statement about the reliance of actual farmers and ranchers on the formal law, see
Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta County, 38 STAN.
L. REv. 623 (1986).
The theorem has been defended (1) as a correct empirical proposition about human
behavior, see, e.g., Hoffman & Spitzer, The Coase Theorem: Some Experimental Tests, 25 J.L. &
EcoXN. 73 (1982): (2) as a tool that can be used to reconceptualize common-law categories,
see, e.g., Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of
the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. RF-v. 1089 (1972) (combines property and tort): and (3) as a new
professional paradigm for the legal culture, see, e.g., B. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERI-
CAN LAW 46-71 (1984).
In addition to this legal commentary, the theorem has also inspired a great deal of
economic literature. See generally Hoffman & Spitzer, supra at 73-77 & n.3 (summarizing
economic literature on the theorem).
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ated with conservative political philosophy.' The thesis of this Ar-
ticle, however, is that the theorem is controversial because it has
an end-state or distributive justice political structure. As a result,
it presents a normative framework and a theory of rights that are
at odds with the historical or transactional justice framework dom-
inant in classical common-law thought. In the process, it forces
the legal culture to confront a political structure whose meaning
and legitimacy animate much of modern legal scholarship. Rather
than just a law and economics proposition, the Coase theorem can
be viewed as a thought experiment whose meaning is troublesome
because it serves as the shorthand expression for a political struc-
ture whose meaning and legitimacy animate much of modern le-
gal scholarship. By focusing legal dialogue on the questions and
validity of that political structure, the theorem forces the legal
culture to deal with many of the central political concerns animat-
ing modern legal scholarship. In short, the Coase theorem makes
the legal culture consider the political nature of its past, the politi-
cal possibilities of its future, and the political controversies of its
present.
To develop this thesis, Section II of this Article sketches a
caricature of two familiar political perspectives: a transactional
justice vision (TJV) and a distributive justice vision (DJV)-each
of which plays a central role in modern legal thought. The norma-
tive framework of each vision is discussed, as is the concept of
rights and the role of the state dominant in each vision. I will ar-
gue that the TJV assumes a unified or complete theory of rights,
while, in contrast, the DJV assumes a disintegrated or Hohfeldian
theory of rights. After this general background, Section II also
considers the end-state or DJV nature of the Coase theorem.
3. See Horwitz, supra note 2: Kelman, Ideology in the Coase Theorem, supra note 2:
Priest, Gossiping About Ideas (Book Review), 93 YAi.u LJ. 1625, 1634-35 (1984). A signifi-
cant recent exception to this is Schlag, An Appreciative Comment on Coase's ''he Problem of
Social Cost: A View from the Left, 1986 Wis. L. REv. 919.
The theorem's politics are not the only reason for its notoriety. It also carries with it a
certain psychological structure. See Gjerdingen, The Coase Theorem and the Psychology of Com-
mon-Law Thought, 56 S. C0A L. RF:v. 711 (1983) (theorem controversial because it challenges
implicit, yet critical, proposition of traditional legal training that normative legal argument
must ultimately be grounded in the intuitional thought of laypersons). Moreover, there also
are as yet unexplored connections between the psychological structure of the theorem, its
political structure, and the form of legal discourse. Other topics that have yet to be ex-
plored include: (1) the relationship between common-law thought and the theorem: and (2)
the relationship between the theorem and the substantive issues associated with the DJV.
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Section III considers the significance of the TJV and the DJV
for the legal culture. I argue that the constitutional events of
1937 fundamentally changed the nature of modern American
politics and the nature of modern political philosophy. In particu-
lar, the events of 1937 ended the unqualified acceptance of the
TJV that dominated American politics in the Civil War-to-1937
era and legitimated the use of the DJV in the post-1937 era. In
turn, this gave rise to a series of controversial issues in political
philosophy that focused on the need to justify an end-state version
of liberalism and the proper relationship between the TJV and
the DJV.
Section IV considers why the Coase theorem is perceived by
the legal culture as such a controversial proposition. Given the
distributive justice structure of the Coase theorem and the nature
of the political issues of the events of 1937, three different sources
of political controversy can be isolated for the theorem. First, be-
cause the TJV formed the basis for classical legal thought, the
theorem, with its DJV structure, forces the legal culture to con-
front both the specific politics of common-law thought and the
general relationship between law and politics. Second, because the
theorem carries with it the implicit structure of the DJV, the legal
culture is forced to confront the controversial political structure
of the DJV itself. Third, and perhaps most important, because the
theorem also serves as a vehicle for the merging of the TJV (usu-
ally from what lawyers bring to it) with the DJV (from the nature
of the theorem itself), it also serves as a vehicle for presenting the
legal culture with the difficult political issues that attend the simi-
lar merging of those visions in the context of the events of 1937.
Thus, the theorem is controversial because the legal culture, in its
reaction to the theorem, reflects its own disagreement and con-
cern over these issues. In this sense, much of the controversy sur-
rounding the theorem is derivative: the theorem is controversial
in large part because of the controversies of modern political phi-
losophy that it reflects.
II. POLITICAL VISIONS, POLITICAL RIGHTS
The TJV and the DJV presented here are caricatures. None-
theless, each has a special meaning for the legal culture. The gen-
esis and legitimacy of each vision, along with the tension and in-
terplay that exist between them, represent issues of fundamental
8751986]
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theoretical and practical importance for the legal culture. For the
present generation of legal scholars, understanding the signifi-
cance of these visions is an important first step towards under-
standing why the Coase theorem, with its implicit end-state struc-
ture, is so controversial.
A. The Transactional Justice Vision
The transactional justice vision is a recurring and often dom-
inant theme in American legal thought. This vision, which has
had a major influence on conventional legal thought, stresses two
central features-(1) a normative framework based on principles
of historical justice and a limited role for the state; and (2) a uni-
fied or complete theory of rights.
1. Normative Framework. The normative framework of the
TJV is one of historical justice." Autonomous individuals make
bargains with each other, governed by general free-market princi-
ples that are tempered by the application of idealized dominant
social standards. Individuals have irreducible spheres of autonomy
free from the control of other persons. Protected by these bound-
aries, individuals exercise their autonomy and interact with other
autonomous individuals. Each person is expected to protect his or
her own boundaries and to respect those of others. Disputes about
unprivileged boundary crossings are centered around standards
that existed at the time of the disputed move. The propriety of
the move is judged by standards of historical justice as applied to
4. See B. ACKERMAN, supra note 2, at 24-28: R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY
AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985) Ihereinafter R. EPSTEIN. TAKINGS]: R. EPSTEIN,
A THEORY OF STRIC'r LIABILITY: TOWARD A REFORMuIXrlON OF TORT LAW (1980), 0, FRIED,
CONTRACTI AS PRoMISE. A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION (1981): F. HEGEL, PHILOSO-
PHY OF RGH'r 21-39 (f. Knox trans. 1942) (1st ed. 1821); J. LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF
GOVERNMENT 287-90, 303-20, 368-84 (P. Laslett ed. 1960) (1st ed. 1689); R. NozIcX, ANAR-
CHY, S'rATE, AND UTOPIA (1974): Coleman, Corrective Justice and Wrongful Gain, 11 J. LEGAL
STUD. 421 (1982): Coleman, Moral Theories of Torts: Their Scope and Limits (pts. 1 & 2), 1
LAW & PHI.. 371 (1982), 2 LAW & PHIL. 5 (1983): Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice
and Its Utilitarian Constraints, 8 J. LEGAL S'uD. 49 (1979) jhereinafter Epstein, Nuisance
Laws: Epstein, Causation and Corrective Justice: A Reply to Two Critics, 8 J. LEGAL. STUD. 477
(1979) 1hereinafter Epstein, Causation and Corrective Justice 1: Epstein, Private Property and
the Public Domain: The Case of Antitrust, in ETHICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE LAW: NoMos XXIV
48 a. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1982) 1hereinafter Epstein, The Case of Antitrust];
Weinrib, Toward a Moral Theory of Negligence Law, 2 LAW & PHIL. 37 (1983); see also Chayes,
The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1281, 1282-88 (1976)
Mashaw, "Rights" in the Federal Administrative State, 92 YALE LJ. 1129, 1152-58 (1983).
5. See R. NoZiCK, supra note 4, at 150-60.
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the immediate parties to the dispute. Within this structure, the
role of the state is to police these moves without changing existing
boundaries or interfering with the exercise of individual auton-
omy. The status quo is prima facie just in the TJV. If achieved
through the use of historically correct moves, the status quo and
the expectations associated with it reflect the desired state of af-
fairs. The existing rights reflected in the status quo are thus pre-
sumed to be legitimate. As a result, a necessary connection exists
in the TJV between what is and what ought to be.
2. Concept of Rights. The TJV also assumes the existence
of a complete or unified theory of rights.6 Rights are assumed to
preexist the state. People already have spheres of authority, such
as personal autonomy and bodily integrity, as a feature of their
existence as persons. The state recognizes and protects these
rights but does not create them. These spheres of authority are
assumed to be already in place and physicalized in the world. Indi-
vidual moves take place against a set background and are judged
in light of standards of conduct drawn from existing dominant so-
cial expectations.
The TJV assumes that people have rights in things. Physical
spaces and things are the usual objects of control; physical domin-
ion is the usual manifestation of control. Physical boundaries thus
become important and designate the things subject to dominion.
Consistent with its emphasis on personal autonomy, the concept of
rights in the TJV designates which persons may exercise auton-
omy with respect to what things and places. Autonomy by its very
6. This theory puts forward three principal propositions all of which are related: (1)
that rights preexist the state: (2) that rights can be reified or treated as things that literally
exist in the world: and (3) that such things have "essences" that define the nature of the
right.
While few people talk explicitly about these characteristics, there nonetheless seems to
be a common understanding that these are the basis of TJV rights, not only among those
who support such theories, but among those who attack them. Thus, conservatives such as
Nozick assume that rights exist and that the important dialogue should be addressed to-
ward the question of how to protect them. See R. NoziCK, supra note 4, at ix-xiv. Equally
clear patterns, however, seem to appear from the attack by the Realists on the "lump-sum"
thinking associated with legal thought in a 'IJV framework. See, e.g., K. LL.WELLYN, THE
COMMON LAw TRADrIION: DECIDIN; APPEAIS 19-27 (1960): Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense
and the Functional Approach, 35 Coi.uM. L. REv. 809, 809-21 (1935): Fuller, American Legal
Realism, 82 U. PA. L. Rpv. 429, 431-43 (1934). Similar attacks appear in parodies of this




nature is a manifestation of individual will and cannot be shared.
The owner is the person who can exercise complete dominion.
The right attaches to the physical boundaries and to the person
who may exercise dominion. Thus, the assumption that people
have rights in things reinforces the need for the designation and
protection of spheres of personal autonomy, a central feature of
the TJV.
Moreover, this concept of rights represents a single, unified
framework for determining (1) the background assumptions about
individuals; (2) the substantive standards that govern what individ-
uals are allowed to do vis-a-vis other individuals; (3) the proce-
dural rules and standards of disputes; and (4) the role of the state
vis-a-vis the parties. While in the abstract these four factors need
not necessarily be viewed as related, one of the features of the
TJV is that each is necessarily related and understood by refer-
ence to a single framework of rights. Necessarily bound up in the
complete rights of the TJV is an interlocking set of assumptions
about these factors. For example, the TJV typically is concerned
with property rights. The designation of the property right indi-
cates not only the starting points of the people involved (i.e., what
people own) and the nature of the background assumptions about
the parties' rights of physical autonomy, but also the nature of the
types of moves that violate that right (e.g., physical invasions or
interference with control) and the expectations vis-a-vis the state
(i.e., these rights preexist the state). Moreover, under the TJV,
right and remedy are necessarily related. Thus, only the person
who owns the property right can complain about any violations of
that sphere, and only the person who violates the autonomy of
another can be held responsible.
B. The Distributive Justice Vision
A contrasting vision in American law is that of distributive
justice.7 Rather than being concerned about whether moves be-
tween autonomous individuals are historically correct, the DJV is
concerned with the validity of the existing distribution of power,
wealth, and position in society. Significantly, this concern gener-
7. See B. ACRIRMAN, supra note 2, at 28-37: R. NozicK, supra note 4, at 149-231:
Chayes, supra note 4, at 1288-1304: Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The
Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. RF.v. 1, 17-28 (1979): Mashaw, supra note 4, at 1152-58.
878 [Vol. 35
POLITICS OF THE COASE THEOREM
ates both a normative framework and a conception of rights at
odds with the TJV.
1. Normative Framework. From the distributive justice per-
spective, disputes are concerned not so much with correcting im-
proper moves between autonomous individuals but with decisions
about the nature, implementation, and resolution of end-state or
patterned goals in society.8 The existing distribution of power and
the structure of society are assessed against an end-state perspec-
tive. The substance of the particular end-state pattern used may
vary, and no particular end-state pattern is necessarily pre-
ordained. Disputes may arise about what substantive pattern to
implement or about how to refine goals already selected as legiti-
mate. Once chosen, however, the selected end-state vision is used
to assess the existing state of affairs in society.
Against this background, individual conduct may generate
systemic problems even though each individual move was inno-
cent by the standards of transactional justice. If the status quo
deviates from the desired end-state pattern, a problem exists de-
spite the fact that the status quo was reached by a series of indi-
vidual moves, each of which, taken alone, satisfied the standards
of historical justice. Accordingly, to implement the desired pat-
tern, the state may intervene in particular transactions between
individuals even though the person harmed by the intervention is
faultless and the person benefited is undeserving. As a result, the
status quo is no longer entitled to prima facie legitimacy. No nec-
essary connection exists between the existing state of affairs in so-
ciety and what is needed to satisfy the desired end-state goal.
Once considered in light of the desired state of affairs, the status
quo may be found to be consistent with the end-state or, even if
inconsistent, may nonetheless be chosen as a second-best imple-
mentation of the end-state goal. Thus, in the DJV, the status quo
is not used (as it is in the TJV) as a necessary reference point for
determining deviant actions.
Within the DJV, the state plays a special role. A central fea-
ture of distributive justice is that a problem may exist -(i.e., a
deviation from the desired end-state pattern) even though each
person individually may have acted in a historically correct man-
8. See R. NozICK, supra note 4, at 149-231.
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ner.9 The overall distribution of wealth and power in society may
be suspect even though the wealthy and powerful may have at-
tained their position without violating the transactional justice
rights of others and even though the poor and powerless may not
have been the victims of any violations of their transactional jus-
tice rights by others. Thus, the state of affairs generated by the
decentralized interaction of individual wills is no longer necessa-
rily correct, and the social structure sustained by dominant social
expectations is no longer necessarily just.10
2. Concept of Rights. The DJV also incorporates an
Hohfeldian concept of rights.11 Rather than dealing with a system
of complete rights in which people are assumed to have rights in
9. See B. AcKERMAN, supra note 2, at 28-32.
10. This also generates three significant changes in the nature and role of the state as
compared to its status under the 'IJV. First, rather than merely policing moves between
individuals, the state becomes an important social-choice mechanism for identifying, criti-
quing, and implementing end-state programs. Once it is accepted that a problem may oc-
cur, even though the standards of historical justice are satisfied, it then becomes necessary
to identify what types of problems can exist, when they will exist, and how they can be
remedied. Disputes would be expected to focus on the information needed to implement
and critique end-state patterns rather than on individual instances of wrongdoing. This
requires an ongoing choice and assessment of ends. Problems cannot be assumed to be self-
identifying or self-correcting. An ongoing dialogue is required among many interests. Most
importantly, the state is deemed to take an active role in the process. From an end-state
perspective, deviant conditions that are allowed to exist are as much a problem as deviant
conditions that are actively created. As a result, the state is necessarily assumed to be par-
tially responsible for the status quo in society.
A second and closely related idea is that the character of the state changes. In the TJV
the state is perceived as a narrow and bounded concept. The state polices moves by individ-
uals, and reinforces dominant social expectations. Other than these tasks, the state has no
special role to play. Moreover, a clean boundary is assumed to exist between private and
public spheres. Once it is accepted that the transactional justice framework itself is not
necessarily the product of individual wills alone but may also be the partial product of state
power and societal choice, then the distinction between public and private is no longer as
meaningful. See Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8 (1927). See generally
Symposium on The Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1289 (1982) (tracing general
breakdown in public/private distinction in American law). Similarly, once it is accepted
that societal choices may be made on a basis other than individual wills and dominant social
expectations, then it also becomes important to consider the legitimacy and character of
those organizations that in fact decide what end-state patterns will be selected and how
they will be implemented. Thus, while the DJV assumes that the state must play an active
role in the selection of end-state programs, the definition of what constitutes the state must
be expanded beyond the narrow 1°V to one which recognizes the decision-making power
of a variety of organizations and groups that help to implement end-state patterns. See
Jaffe, Law Making by Private Groups, 51 HARV. L. REV. 201 (1937).
11. See W. HOHFEI.D, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REA-
SONIN; (1919).
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things, the Hohfeldian perspective assumes a system of dis-
integrated rights which exist between people with respect to
things.12 This generates both a different role for the state and a
different view of the nature of rights than the TJV.13
A central function of the distributive justice vision is the mak-
ing of choices: some end-state patterns will be chosen while others
will not; some people, because of their status, will be chosen to
benefit from end-state goals while others, also because of their sta-
tus, will not; and some parts of the social structure will be open to
scrutiny while others will not. In essence, end-state patterns con-
12. Hohfeld's rejection of the idea that people have rights in things and his corre-
sponding "dephysicalization" of rights is evident even in his early work. See Hohfeld, Fun-
damental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE LJ. 710 (1917). For
example, the categories of rights in rem and in personam,.concepts that correlate well if it
already is assumed that people have rights in things, no longer are first order concepts. See
id. Similarly, reification of rights (i.e., physicalization) is no longer important. See Hohfeld,
Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE LJ. 16, 20-25
(1913) (implicit rejection of reified view of property).
A candid statement of the nature of the change from the reification/in-things perspec-
tive to the dephysicalized/between-people perspective is found in Radin, A Restatement of
Hohfeld, 51 HARV. L. REv. 1141 (1938):
When we attempt to use Hohfeld's, or indeed any "analysis", we are dealing
with an attempt at a legal algebra or a geometry, the purpose of which is more
modest than that which is effected by the mathematical organa usually under-
stood under these names. We are concerned with an algebra that will enable us
to describe some precise and repeated situations, the actual judgments of
courts, in such a way that any judgment can fall into the scheme. It will be of
some service in the larger task either of collecting, memorizing or teaching
these judgments, but not in the much more vitally important task of forecasting
them.
There are certain postulates we begin with....
First of all, there is only one unit in the law, as thus formulated, and that is a
human being, every human being and nothing but a human being. There is no
corporation, no state, no quasi-corporation, nojuristic person, no nasciturus, no
.estate", no "entity", no "civil death".
Secondly, the only legal fact at our first level is a relation between two such
human beings. No relation that has legal relevance exists between a human be-
ing and a thing, between a human being and a group of other human beings
considered as a group, nor between a human being and an abstract idea. There
is no right in rem and no action in rem. All these terms are useful and signifi-
cant, as we may discover, in other connections, but they do not concern us now.
Id. at 1146-47 (footnote omitted).
13. See Gjerdingen, supra note 3, at 715-28. For an excellent exposition of the rela-
tionship between the physicalization or reification of property rights and the choice be-
tween a Hohfeldian perspective versus rights in things, see Grey, The Disintegration of Prop-
erty, in PRoP'R'ry: NoMos XXII 69 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1980); Vandevelde, The
New Property of the Nineteenth Century: The Development of the Modern Concept of Property, 29
BUFFALO L. RF:v. 325, 328-35, 357-67 (1980).
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stitute sets of choices about what types of people are to be favored
for what types of reasons with respect to what type of power. Con-
sistent with the Hohfeldian perspective that rights exist between
people with respect to things, the concept of rights in the DJV
involves a series of choices between people with respect to wealth,
position, and power in society.14 From this perspective, rights are
more concerned with the implementation of patterns across
groups than with the designation of areas of individual autonomy.
Rights attach to anyone who meets the relevant end-state criteria.
Individual autonomy and physical dominion are no longer neces-
sarily relevant. Similarly, physicalization is unimportant because
patterns across society are more relevant than individual areas of
autonomy.' 5
The end-state concept of rights is concerned about the rela-
tionship of society to the desired pattern. Rights are no longer
exclusive but, instead, are collective; one person's right to inclu-
sion in the relevant group does not necessarily diminish another
person's right.' 6 The DJV also implies that the very existence of
end-state rights is partially a matter of choice and that the fulfill-
ment of such rights is partially dependent on affirmative actions
by the state. The Hohfeldian concept of rights existing between
people with respect to things thus reinforces the nonexclusive,
dephysicalized nature of rights in an activist state, distributive jus-
tice political system.' In contrast to the system of rights in the
TJV, which emphasizes exclusive, individual rights that preexist
the state, the Hohfeldian notion captures the features of choice,
group entitlements, and conflicting substantive patterns that are
central features of the DJV.' 8
The Hohfeldian perspective also assumes a disintegrated the-
ory of rights. Unlike the unified theory of rights associated with
14. See Grey, supra note 13; Vandevelde, supra note 13.
15. See Grey, supra note 13.
16. Conceptualizing rights as relationships that people have in things generates a no-
tion of exclusive rights, while viewing rights as between people with respect to things gen-
erates a notion of nonexclusive rights. Similarly, the Hohfeldian perspective implies that
the content of the right is derived in part from action of the state.
17. See B. ACKERMAN, PRIVAT- PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 26-29 (1977); Gjerd-
ingen, supra note 3, at 746-49.
18. This was evident, for example, in much of the Hohfeldian analysis of the legal
realists in their attack on pre-1937 Supreme Court doctrine. See, e.g., Cook, Privileges of
Labor Unions in the Struggle for Life, 27 YA.E LJ. 779 (1918).
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the TJV, in the DJV there is no necessary connection between
existing rights and rights required for a just state of affairs. The
status quo merely serves as a starting point. If it matches the ex-
pectations of the end-state pattern, the status quo is just. If it devi-
ates an unacceptable amount from the desired pattern, however,
it is not. If the status quo is entitled to legitimacy, it is because it
conforms, within tolerable limits, to the preferred end-state pat-
tern and not merely because it happens to be the status quo.
Thus, in the DJV, there is no necessary connection between what
is and what ought to be.
Another aspect of the Hohfeldian perspective of disintegrated
rights in the DJV is that there is no necessary connection between
the four features of rights in the TJV.19 For example, the concept
of remedy in the DJV is independent of any previously existing
transactional justice right. A remedy in the DJV is derived from a
comparison of the status quo to the end-state pattern. If the status
quo deviates an unacceptable amount from the desired pattern,
the remedy is the action needed to alleviate the discrepancy. A
person may be entitled to a remedy even though no transactional
justice rights were violated and a person may be liable, not be-
cause of any fault or personal misconduct, but only because he or
she has the power to change the status quo. An entitlement to an
end-state remedy, therefore, is not necessarily dependent on the
existence or violation of a transactional justice right. Similarly,
there is no necessary connection between who can be a party to a
dispute and who is immediately affected by the controversy. While
the TJV only allows persons whose individual rights have been vi-
olated to initiate or argue a dispute, the DJV is more concerned
about which persons are best able to supply information or to ar-
gue the dispute. Thus, there is no necessary connection between
who may be a party to a dispute and whose rights are at issue.
Sometimes the immediate parties affected may be in the best posi-
tion to initiate and argue the dispute while at other times they
may not.
19. These Hohfeldian aspects of the DJV have already generated a rich literature. See,
e.g., Chayes, supra note 4: Fiss, supra note 7: Stewart, The Reformation of American Adminis-
trative Law, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1669 (1975). While much of the literature provides a good
description of the influence of such Hohfeldian notions, it has not, however, taken the
additional step of expressly linking these aspects of procedure to particular political visions.
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C. Cows, Corn, and the Distributive Justice Vision-The Coase Theo-
rem as an End-State Proposition
The conventional wisdom is that the Coase theorem is inex-
tricably associated with conservative political philosophy and with
law and economics. The theorem was initially proposed as a the-
ory of economic efficiency that could be used to justify less gov-
ernment intervention in the marketplace. 20 As a result, it is usu-
ally associated with the Chicago school of law and economics.21
The theorem, however, is more than merely a law and economics
proposition, and it is not necessarily a conservative proposition.
The reason for this is that the theorem implicitly presupposes the
existence of the DJV.
When a Coasean perspective is taken, DJV questions become
important and the TJV questions become unimportant. The
Coase theorem does not imply (as it has so often been misunder-
stood to imply) that every legal issue should be reduced to the use
of economic efficiency by the courts to assign entitlements to liti-
gants in common-law actions. Instead, it simply implies a perspec-
tive-that of the DJV-whose significance cannot be limited to
efficiency, court decisions, or the common law. As a result, the
Coase theorem and the reaction of the legal culture to it are of
greater significance than is usually supposed.
At the outset, it is important to distinguish the law and eco-
nomics interpretation of the theorem from the political structure
of the theorem itself.2 Although the commentary on the theorem
20. See Coase, supra note 1, at 17-18, 42-44: Horwitz, supra note 2: Kennedy, supra
note 2, at 393-98: Priest, supra note 3, at 1634-35.
21. See, e.g., Kelman, Ideology in the Coase Theorem, supra note 2.
22. See B. AcKERMAN, supra note 2, at 46-71.
A good summary of the law and economics interpretation of the theorem can be found
in Coleman, The Economic Analysis of Law, in EDmius, EcONOMICS, AND THE LAW: NOMOS
XXIV 83 (1. Pennock &J. Chapman eds. 1982):
Commentators have seen in Coase's argument the basis of a formal or ana-
lytic claim about the relation between the goal of economic efficiency and the
assignment of legal rights as an instrument in its pursuit. This is the Coase The-
orem. 'here are as many ways of stating the theorem as there are illustrations
of it and controversies arising from it. I prefer to state it as follows: if we as-
sume that the relevant parties to negotiations are rational, that they have sub-
stantial knowledge of their own and one another's preferences, that transac-
tions between them are costless, that the state will enforce contracts between
them, that their negotiations are not affected by their relative wealth (no in-
come effects), that the prices on the basis of which they bid against one another
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almost universally conflates the two issues, it is critical for a
proper understanding of the place of the theorem in modern legal
scholarship that these issues be distinguished. In his article that
proposed the theorem, Ronald Coase made two different assump-
tions, each of which contributed to its controversy. First, he im-
plicitly assumed that the DJV was the relevant political structure.
Even before his specific economic argument was advanced, he pre-
supposed that it would operate in a distributive justice political
structure. Second, Coase proposed a law and economics interpre-
tation of the DJV and made certain common-law assumptions
about its application. What is significant is that, although Coase's
second point presupposes his first, his first point need not lead
only to his second. As a result, the law and economics interpreta-
tion usually associated with the theorem in fact represents only
one of many possible variations of the DJV. Moreover, the theo-
rem need not be associated only with law and economics or only
with conservative politics.
To illustrate this point, some of the implicit assumptions of
the Coase theorem are compared in the following discussion with
the assumptions of the DJV in three areas: normative framework;
theory of rights; and nature of disputes. After looking at each of
these assumptions, some final arguments will be made about the
politics of the theorem.
1. The Normative Framework of the Theorem-End-State Pro-
positions, the Status Quo, and the Role of the State. The Coase theo-
rem presupposes the normative framework' of the DJV. All of the
central normative assumptions of the DJV are present in the
are given to them rather than established by their negotiations (the partial equi-
librium model), the assignmeni of property rights by the state to either party
will be irrelevant to the goal of efficiency, provided of course that the rights are
divisible and negotiable.
I state the theorem with all these qualifications, partly for effect, and partly
because so much confusion arises in its application simply because commenta-
tors either ignore or are unfamiliar with all the initial conditions that must be
satisfied. The basic idea is really quite simple, however. As long as two people,
A and B, can negotiate with one another, it won't matter from the point of
view of efficiency whether the state gives B the right to prevent A from acting
in a way that adversely affects B: or A the right to act in a way that harms B. As
long as transactions are costless, A and B will negotiate to an efficient level of
their respective activities through the process of mutual gain via trade, though
there is no guarantee that they will negotiate to the same efficient distribution.
Id. at 92-93 (footnote.omitted) (emphasis in original).
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framework of the Coase theorem. First, rather than determining
whether the actions of the parties' moves are historically correct,
the Coase theorem determines whether such actions satisfy a
given end-state standard. The particular end-state standard used
in the theorem is economic efficiency-a Pareto optimal standard.2"
So long as the existing state of affairs is not Pareto optimal, a
problem exists that justifies corrective action. The remedy, of
course, is to propose Pareto superior moves.
Second, it is already assumed that the state will play an impor-
tant role in the creation of rights and the implementation of end-
state goals. Within the political framework presupposed by the
theorem, a conscious choice of entitlement must be made by
someone other than the immediate parties involved.24 A choice
23. See Coleman, Ffficiency, Exchange, and Auction: Philosophic Aspects of the Economic Ap-
proach to Law, 68 CALF. L. REv. 221, 223-31 (1980): Gjerdingen, supra note 3, at 753
n.205: Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973).
The political idea that I'm trying to capture is that, in the DJV, the existing structure of
power is subject to scrutiny. The existing power structure, whether it be in the market-
place, the family, the government bureaucracy, or the social structure, is no longer off
limits-it can be challenged. Simply because the status quo is the status quo is no longer a
valid normative argument within this framework for preferring the current state of affairs.
The legitimacy of the current state of affairs derives from its correspondence with chosen
end-state principles and not because of any special preference for the current power struc-
ture in society. Given this backgro;und, I am arguing that the Coase theorem has already
presupposed this general political orientation. It is important, however, to distinguish be-
tween the place of my general comments about the importance of the status quo in the
DJV and the use of the status quo in the definition of Pareto optimality because the status
quo is an important part of the end-state principle of the law and economics version of the
DJV.
When I state that the status quo is not entitled to any special legitimacy in the DJV, I
mean only that the existing power structures in society are subject to scrutiny. I do not
mean that the existing status quo-in the sense of the existing state of affairs-is of no
importance at all. Unless we have some given starting points, we can never have economic
efficiency. Thus, there are two different ways in which the status quo is used in relation to
the definition of economic efficiency. First, some state of affairs must be giveri before bar-
gains can be made. Until we specify what the pre-bargain status quo is, there can be no
bargain. Second, there is the state of affairs that exists after bargains are made. This post-
bargain status quo may be the preferred state of affairs in an end-state world governed by
economic efficiency, but it is so only because it has satisfied the relevant end-state standard.
Once we have reached the relevant end-state standard the status quo becomes just, as it is
now in line with the relevant end-state principle of justice. Thus, I do not view my state-
ment about the use of the status quo in the DJV as inconsistent with the use of Pareto
optimality as an end-state standard.
24. This point was not treated at any length in Coase's article simply because it was
not necessary to his thesis. Thus, in his discussion about the application of the theorem in
the absence of transaction costs, Coase simply stated:
It is necessary to know whether the damaging business is liable or not for
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must be made, for example, whether to place the initial liability
on the rancher or the farmer. Once that choice has been made,
the theorem specifies that the rancher and the farmer will bargain
to an economically efficient result. Significantly, however, the
choice of that initial placement of liability cannot be made by ei-
ther the rancher or the farmer but, instead, must be made by a
third party (e.g., the state or some other social choice mechanism)
based on criteria other than the wills of the parties involved. Simi-
larly, in making that choice, the state must decide not only who
will get the rights, but also how those rights will be protected25
and what the subject of the entitlement will be. 6 Whatever the
final properties of the entitlement, it is clear that the right is
largely a creation of the state.
Third, the status quo is not granted any special legitimacy.
Prior dealing between the parties and existing boundaries or dis-
tribution of rights are of no special importance. It is assumed in-
stead that the existing state of affairs is to be judged against the
particular end-state standard of economic efficiency. The exis-
tence of some distribution of boundaries, of course, must be as-
sumed for the theorem to apply at all. The economic interpreta-
tion of the theorem assumes that both the rancher and the farmer
have rights defined by certain existing boundaries, are involved in
certain activities, and possess certain capacities, such as the ability
to bargain. Significantly, however, what that distribution may
have been is important only insofar as it provides a set of facts for
damage caused since without the establishment of this initial delimitation of
rights there can be no market transactions to transfer and recombine them. But
the ultimate result (which maximizes the value of production) is independent of
the legal position if the pricing system is assumed to work without cost.
Coase, supra note 1, at 8.
In his discussion of the effect of the presence of transaction costs, Coase noted that "the
situation is quite different when market transactions are so costly as to make it difficult to
change the arrangement of rights established by the law. Insuch cases, the courts [i.e., the
statej directly influence economic activity." Id. at 19.
25. For example, the state must decide whether the entitlement is inalienable or is
protected by a property or a liability rule. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 2, at 1092-
93, 1105-10, 1115-24: Kronman, Specific Performance, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 351 (1978).
26. Coase initially only considered the issue of common-law nuisance, a matter of land
use. There was nothing about the structure of the theorem, however, that dictated what
the subject of the entitlement should be. Rather than a matter of land use between two
persons, it could involve all farmers and all ranchers (i.e., a group entitlement), see Ken-
nedy, supra note 2, at 438-43, or a social status rather than farming (i.e., an entitlement to
a certain state of the social structure).
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the application of economic efficiency. Thus, the status quo is of
no special importance: if it is already Pareto optimal, then it is
correct; if it is not Pareto optimal, then it must be remedied.
Rather than a preferred state of affairs, the status quo is merely a
convenient starting point.
2. The Theory of Rights in the Theorem-Hohfeldian Rights, a
"Thin" Theory of Rights, and the Demise of Personal Auton-
omy. Similar to its presupposition of the DJV, the framework of
the Coase theorem assumes the Hohfeldian theory of rights. The
essential question for determination is a choice between the
rancher and the farmer with respect to implementation of an end-
state goal. Neither person is assumed to have any particular pre-
existing rights of autonomy. Rather, their rights are derived from
the end-state principle adopted (i.e., those rights which it assumes
to exist). Because the end-state principle is Pareto optimal, the
rancher and the farmer are assumed only to have the basic ability
to bargain to a Pareto optimal result. They are guaranteed no
richer set of rights." As a result, the TJV concept of rights, which
stresses personal autonomy, physical dominion, and individual
rights, is eroded. End-state criteria rather than reification deter-
mine the existence and nature of rights.2 8 For example, dominion
27. For a good discussion of this problem as it pertains to economic analysis generally,
see Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory, 6 PHIL &
PUB. AFF. 317 (1977).
28. Coase does not think of people having rights in things but rather of relationships
between people. This is implied in his discussion about rights being factors of production:
A final reason for the failure to develop a theory adequate to handle the
problem of harmful effects stems from a faulty concept of a factor of produc-
tion. This is usually thought of as a physical entity which the businessman ac-
quires and uses (an acre of land, a ton of fertilizer) instead of as a right to
perform certain (physical) actions. We may speak of a person owning land and
using it as a factor of production but what the landowner in fact possesses is the
right to carry out a circumscribed list of actions. The rights of a landowner are
not unlimited. It is not even always possible for him to remove the land to an-
other place, for instance, by quarrying it. And although it may be possible for
him to exclude some people from using "his" land, this may not be true of
others. For example, some people may have the right to cross the land. Fur-
thermore, it may or may not be possible to erect certain types of buildings or to
grow certain crops or to use particular drainage systems on the land. This does
not come about simply because of Government regulation. It would be equally
true under the common law. In fact it would be true under any system of law.
A system in which the rights of individuals were unlimited would be one in
which there were no rights to acquire.
If factors of production are thought of as rights, it becomes easier to under-
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over property and a sphere of control is no longer assumed to
exist and rights are no longer physicalized. Conventional physical
barriers may mark their starting point, but these are only prelimi-
nary assumptions rather than the hallmark of substantive rights.29
For example, if the initial legal liability is placed upon the
rancher, even though the farmer has an entitlement to farm, the
farmer no longer has complete physical dominion over the activi-
ties that take place on his land. Instead, he is subject to a possible
veto by the rancher merely upon the payment of an objectively set
amount of money.30 From this perspective, once the initial liability
has been placed on the rancher, physical boundaries are impor-
tant only insofar as they help to designate who must do the brib-
ing. If the activity takes place entirely on the rancher's land, he
must absorb the cost. Similarly, if the activity is connected with
the farmer's land, the rancher must be bribed to alter his
behavior.
Autonomy with respect to control over bargaining also is
eroded in the context of the theorem. Bargaining is no longer a
matter of individual choice. Because of the assumption of no
transaction costs and cooperative bargaining, it is already assumed
that a bargain will be made between certain people, regardless of
the actual desires of the persons involved."1 The result mandated
stand that the right to do something which has a harmful effect (such as the
creation of smoke, noise, smells, etc.) is also a factor of production. Just as we
may use a piece of land in such a way as to prevent someone else from crossing
it, or parking his car, or building his house upon it, so we may use it in such a
way as to deny him a view or quiet or unpolluted air. The cost of exercising a
right (of using a factor of production) is always the loss which is suffered else-
where in consequence of the exercise of that right-the inability to cross land,
to park a car, to build a house, to enjoy a view, to have peace and quiet or to
breathe clean air.
Coase, supra note 1, at 43-44.
29. See Gjerdingen, supra note 3, at 724-26.
30. See Coase, supra note 1, at 6-8; Gjerdingen, supra note 3, at 725-26.
31. Moreover, even if transaction costs are present, the state must do two things. First,
it must guess what the parties would have done. See Note, Efficiency and a Rule of "Free
Contract": A Critique of Two Models of Law and Economics, 97 HARV. L. REV. 978, 988-94
(1984) Ihereinafter Two Models of Law and Economicsl. This, of course, infringes on auton-
omy. See Weinrib, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 30 U. TORONTO L.J. 307, 319-
24 (1980). As Weinrib notes, "Actual markets embody respect for the individual and his
choice, whereas [wealth-maximizing i hypothetical markets entail the sacrifice of the inter-
ests of some individuals in the name of maximization." Id. at 322. But see Note, A Theory of
Hypothetical Contract, 94 YAt.F L.J. 415 (1984) (use of hypothetical contracts to protect au-
tonomy). Second, the state's reason for mandating the bargain may be paternalistic, which
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by the theorem may have happened under TJV conditions, but it
certainly is not necessarily what would have happened. In the
TJV, the parties would have been able to choose whether they
could contract or not, with whom they would contract, and for
what purposes. By contrast, in the DJV the assumption of cooper-
ative bargaining is merely a way of describing a result that is
equivalent to implementing another end-state result mandated by
the state apart from the actual desires of the parties.
Similarly, the separate existence and independence of each
person, which is critical in the TJV, is severely eroded in the DJV.
In his story about the cows and the corn, Coase assumed a fact
setting involving two different people. Significantly, however, the
theorem would generate the same result if both plots of land were
owned by one person32 or by two million people.33 This indicates
that the right is defined by the relevant entitlement. If the entitle-
ment extends to a large number of persons, it is a collective or
group entitlement and any individual claims are merged into the
whole. By contrast, if the entitlement is assumed to extend only to
a setting involving a conflict between two individuals, then, in es-
sence, it is an individual right.
3. The Nature of Disputes in the Distributive Justice Vi-
sion-Loss of Party Control and the Independence of Right and Rem-
edy. Coase also assumes that the dispute between the rancher and
the farmer takes place in the context of a common-law action."
He assumes that rights are already in place, that boundaries are
already drawn, and that the form of the dispute is a bipolar, com-
mon-law action already before a common-law judge .3  All of
also lessens autonomy. See, e.g., Note, Two Models of Law and Economics, supra at 992-94.
32. See Coase, supra note 1, at 16-17 (discussion of the nature of the firm).
33. Such would be the case if the farming and ranching enterprises were gigantic com-
munes, Indian tribal lands, or even states (e.g., Minnesota cattle and Iowa corn).
34. Of course, even in this case, an individual right within the DJV does not include
such things as complete physical dominion and control. See supra notes 28-30 and accompa-
nying text.
35. See Coase, supra note 1, at 8-28. Coase did, of course, mention the possible appli-
cation of his theory to regulatory questions as well, see id. at 29-36 (discussing statutory
exception to common-law standards), 41-42 (taxation). Most of the discussion, however,
centers on common-law appellate opinions.
36. This was a common assumption in much of the early commentary on the theorem
as well. See I. STEWART & J. KRIER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: READINGS, MATERIALS
AND NOTES 117-62 (2d ed. 1978); Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 2, at 1115-24 (theorem
applied to nuisance cases). I do not mean to imply that any of these scholars were unaware
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these, of course, are permissible assumptions. They must, how-
ever, be recognized as assumptions and not as preconditions to the
use of the theorem itself. The structure of the Coase theorem
need not be so confined since it incorporates the DJV. In fact,
even though the theorem could be applied in a common-law set-
ting, the implicit structure of the theorem evidences a far broader
concept of disputes and litigation.
In the context of the Coase theorem, the nature of the dis-
pute reflects the DJV perspective. In the TJV, parties had control
over their own sphere as a matter of personal autonomy. Not only
was each person assumed to be able to care for his or her own
sphere, but each was also individually responsible for invasions of
another person's sphere. In contrast, in the Coasean framework,
party control is limited. The initiation of disputes (i.e., the calling
of attention to the divergence of the status quo from a desired
end-state goal) is no longer solely limited to the injured party, but
may include the state or even a third party. If a group of people
are affected by the entitlement, the dispute is not determined by
reference to existing boundaries or rights, but by the selection
and implementation of end-state standards. Moreover, since the
end-state goal need not be based on the wills of the individual per-
sons involved, it must be assumed that the intentions or actions of
the rancher and the farmer are no longer the sole criterion of
decision.31 Relevant information, such as where the initial entitle-
of the assumptions they were making. Their work, however, is important because it empha-
sizes the tendency of others in the legal culture to overlook the fact that using the theorem
in the common-law setting (1) already presupposes the legitimacy of that mode of dispute
resolution along with the techniques and concepts associated with common-law thought,
something that can no longer be accepted automatically in a DJV structure, see B. ACKER-
MAN, supra note 2, at 46-71; Gjerdingen, supra note 3, at 715-28, 740-49 & n.186, 758-60;
and (2) illustrates some of the dominant culturally-bound fixations of lawyers, see, e.g.,
Krier, The Pollution Problem and Legal Institutions: A Conceptual Overview, 18 UCLA L. REv.
429 (197 1) (noting contrasts between traditional legal expectations and activist state prob-
lem of pollution): Posner, Book Review, 37 U. Cm. L. REv. 636, 636-38 (1970) (noting
differences between traditional legal scholarship and economic analysis).
Thus, the common-law assumption is as much what the legal culture brings to the theo-
rem as what the theorem itself says. Coase gaye the legal culture an opportunity to make
such assumptions and they eagerly made them.
37. Thus activities rather than acts became the relevant category. See, e.g., G. CALA-
BRFSI, THE CosIN OF A(CIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 104, 114-19, 274-77
(1970); Michelman, Pollution as a Tort: A Non-Accidental Perspective on Calabresi's Costs
(Book Review), 80 YAI.E L.J. 647, 656-57 & n.19 (1971). This is just another aspect of the
group features of end-state goals and their correspondence to the separateness of persons.
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ment should be set, may be generated by a third party or by the
state.38
Similarly, there is no necessary relationship between who ini-
tiates.the dispute and who has the best information about it.39 In
fact the initial placement of liability does not even have to be on
either the rancher or the farmer, but could be on a third party. 0
Finally, the structure of the theorem is institution independent. 1
Although it can be applied by courts, it certainly need not be so
limited. Decision-making bodies other than courts can be consid-
ered, 4 2 as well as substantive categories other than those of the
common law.43
4. The Coase Theorem and Law and Economics; the Coase Theo-
rem and Conservatism. The law and economics interpretation of
the theorem has to be distinguished from the political structure of
the theorem. The structure of the theorem presupposes the DJV.
Coase made a law and economics assumption and a common-law
assumption to inform the DJV. By making the law and economics
assumption, he assumed that the parties had a thin concept of per-
sonhood, one sufficient to make bargains and Pareto superior
moves. Similarly, he made the common-law assumption that the
existing distribution of rights was already specified, boundaries
were already drawn, and the dispute was already before a com-
mon-law judge. All of these, of course, are permissible assump-
tions, but they must be recognized as only a part of an entire set
38. From the Coasean perspective, it is assumed (1) that someone other than the
rancher or the farmer must set the initial entitlement, and (2) that the wills of the parties
are no longer controlling. As a result, it also follows that the decision maker must look to
sources of information other than the parties themselves. See, e.g., Calabresi, Transaction
Costs, Resource Allocation and Liability Rules-A Comment, 11 J.L. & EcON. 67 (1968).
39. In the context of the Coase theorem this is part of transaction costs. Even if it is
assumed that there are no transaction costs, this absence of a necessary relationship still
holds true simply because transaction costs only deal with the assumptions about the bar-
gaining between the parties and not the choice of initial entitlement itself. In the presence
of transaction costs the additional problem of paternalism arises. See supra note 31.
40. See G. CALABR'.ST, supra note 37, at 136-38.
41. 1 am grateful to Bruce Ackerman for pointing out this aspect of the theorem to
me.
42. See, e.g., G. CALABRFSI, supra note 37 passim (government regulation, legislation,
and the market, as well as courts).
43. See, e.g., B. ACKE.RMAN, supra note 2, at 56-60 (Coasean statement of the facts);
Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 2 (property rules and liability rules instead of common-
law categories of tort and property): Michelman, supra note 37, at 656-57 & n.19 (case-by-
case decision making no longer necessarily best).
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of possible assumptions. The theorem necessarily incorporates the
DJV political structure, but Coase also chose to give that general
structure a particular political interpretation.
This distinction gives rise. to another important point about
the political structure of the theorem. Although the theorem is an
end-state proposition, it need not be a conservative proposition.""
Economic efficiency, of course, is one particular end-state princi-
ple that could be chosen. The particular end-state principle cho-
sen will determine whether the theorem is conservative or liberal.
If a conservative end-state proposition such as wealth maximiza-
tion is used, the theorem can support a conservative end-state re-
sult.4 5 In contrast, if a liberal end-state proposition such as Rawl-
sian maximin,46 or Ackermanian neutral dialogue,47 is chosen, the
theorem can support a liberal end-state result.4
III. POLITICAL VISIONS AND THE EVENTS OF 1937
The TJV and the DJV are caricatures possessing all the limi-
tations which that term implies. They are not, however, without a
special meaning for the legal culture. The constitutional events of
193749 fundamentally changed the American political structure.
These supralegal events ended the unqualified acceptance of the
TJV and legitimated the use of the DJV. The acknowledgement
of this change in American politics is now becoming orthodox. It
is also becoming orthodox to acknowledge that the transition has
44. Cf. Priest, supra note 3, at 1634-35 (deregulation movement uses Coase's work to
mount "sustained attack on the activist state").
45. Thus it becomes important to distinguish transactional justice conservatives, such
as Epstein, from end-state conservatives, such as Posner. While Epstein is very much
against the use of the state to redistribute wealth, etc., Posner champions the idea so long
as the intervention by the state is used to favor the preferences of the wealthy.
46. J. RAWI.s, A THFORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
47. B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JuSTIE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980).
48. My point is not to propose these particular theories as necessarily being the appro-
priate ones to use. Rather, the point is that the theorem, because it necessarily incorporates
the DJV, is only as conservative or as liberal as the political theory that is read into it.
49. 1 am referring to the political events (including the threat of Court-packing) that
precipitated the capitulation of the Court to the programs of the New Deal. See, e.g., P.
FREUND, A. SUTHERLAND, M. HOWE & E. BROWN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND OTHER
PROBi.EMS 260-62 (4th ed. 1977): J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONsTrrUTIONAL LAW
39-41, 157-61 (2d ed. 1983); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrIUTONAL LAW 449-50 (1978). The
specific events are well chronicled in Freund, Charles Evans Hughes as ChiefJustice, 81 HARV.
L. REV. 4 (1967): Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone and FDR's Court Plan, 61 YALE LJ. 791 (1952).
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precipitated significant unrest in the legal culture. However,
what has yet to be fully acknowledged is (1) the relationship be-
tween the events of 1937 and the controversies of modern politi-
cal philosophy, and (2) the further relationship between these con-
troversies and the structure of the Coase theorem.
The events of 1937 stand for two basic propositions. First,
the TJV is no longer entitled to unqualified legitimacy and accept-
ance. It is no longer necessarily acceptable. Second, the DJV is no
longer necessarily illegitimate. It can no longer be automatically
dismissed as irrelevant or unacceptable. Some of the most contro-
versial aspects of modern political philosophy can be understood
as attempts to comprehend and deal with the consequences of
these propositions. 1 A short catalog of some of those concerns
50. See, e.g., Symposium on The Legacy of the New Deal: Problems and Possibilities in the
Administrative State (pts. 1 & 2), 92 YALE LJ. 1083, 1357 (1983); Symposium on Legal Scholar-
ship: Its Nature and Purposes, 90 YALE LJ. 955 (1981).
51. The events of 1937 can be expected to generate significant substantive controver-
sies. The primary substantive concerns of legitimacy, transition, and boundaries, which sur-
round the events of 1937, are significant in their own right simply as matters which invoke
important questions about the nature of modern political philosophy. For a number of
reasons, however, they can be expected to generate a particularly significant amount of
controversy. First, the meaning of the events of 1937 is an issue of immense practical sig-
nificance for present day.events. It is not a mere academic exercise in the possible, but a
real life controversy about the present structure of American political life. Depending on
the answers that are given, real people will gain and real people will lose. This can only
serve to heighten the intensity of the concern about the interpretation of these events.
Second, a variety of different positions on these substantive issues is to be expected.
The events themselves simply sanction the setting up of an agenda for dialogue. It is signif-
icant, of course, that what has to be talked about in the present is different than what had
to be talked about prior to 1937. It is also significant, however, that numerous responses
could be generated which would be consistent with the demands and constraints of the
events of 1937. What has thus been described generally as an "anarchy in ethics," R. Pos-
NER, THE ECONOMICS oF JusrcE v (1983), to some extent has to be expected as a variety of
different positions continue to be advanced. At the same time, however, the very existence
of such a variety of positions can only help to produce a deeper sense of rivalry and faction-
alism as one position competes with the other for acceptance.
Third, no one position at this point can be expected to be totally satisfactory. Because
of the transition that is taking place, orthodox constructs must be reconsidered and new
constructs must be tested and reviewed. Presently, each has its faults, and each must be
expected to draw criticism. In addition, the development of an entirely new vision of polit-
ics may ultimately be necessary. This new vision would, in Hegelian fashion, resolve the
existing conflict between the two visions from yet another perspective. See Bush, Between
Two Worlds: The Shift From Individual to Group Responsibility in the Law of Causation of Injury,
33 UCLA L. REV. 1473 (1986) (proposing communitarian theory of law as solution to con-
flict between TJV and DJV). In any case, at present, any claims of final answers must be
suspect. Moreover, in such circumstances debates about the issues serve an important and
beneficial function, since they ultimately help to generate the dialogue needed to bring the
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can help to illustrate the source of some of the Coase theorem's
controversy.
A. Legitimacy Issues
If the events of 1937 represent a change from an unqualified
transactional justice system to a distributive justice system, then
what is the legitimacy of such a change and how can it be justified
within the liberal tradition? At least three significant issues arose
with respect to the legitimacy of this transition, all of which cre-
ated controversy for political theory.
The first was explaining the legitimacy of the events of 1937
themselves. If the events of 1937 were accepted as legitimate, how
could they be justified within the dominant political tradition? In
this respect, the events of 1937 created special problems. On the
one hand, they were accepted as constituting a supralegal event
tantamount to a constitutional amendment. On the other hand,
the legitimacy of those events could not be explained by orthodox
liberal theory. An attempt to justify the change under conven-
tional social contract theory would be difficult because the formal
amendment process was not used.5 2 Similarly, any attempt to jus-
tify the change on the basis of textualism would be difficult be-
cause of the great inconsistency between the doctrine of the Civil
War-to-1937 era and the modern era. Since textualism assumes
some type of consistent substantive doctrine over time, a strict
textualist would have to say that one of the two periods was
wrong. This in turn, however, would undermine the belief in tex-
tualism as a sufficient check on the abuse of power. Either the le-
gitimacy of the events of 1937 somehow had to be explained in a
way that would satisfy orthodox theory, or existing political the-
ory had to be modified or abandoned. No longer would any single
theory be entitled to unquestioned acceptance. This created a le-
society through the transition period.
In combination these various factors assure that the substantive controversies surround-
ing the events of 1937 will be the subject of intense interest, concern, and dispute. Disa-
greement and controversy not only are an expected incident of their existence, but also a
necessary element of their resolution. In addition, the significant present day consequences
that attach to the dispute and the increased power that awaits those persons who are best
able to explain or rationalize the transition can only be to heighten the sense of urgency.




gitimacy controversy for political theory, the effects of which are
still with us. Some scholars still attempt to interpret the events of
1937 in terms of orthodox theory,53 others attempt to modify or-
thodox theory to accommodate them,54 while still others attempt
to develop new theories of political legitimacy.5 5 Others theorize
that any attempt to resolve this dilemma is futile."'
The second legitimacy controversy was the ability of post-
1937 political theory to construct a coherent end-state version of
liberalism. If the events of 1937 sanctioned the use of the DJV,
then how could a coherent activist state theory be constructed
within the liberal tradition? Once again, orthodox liberal theory
was deficient. Neither traditional social contract theory nor lais-
sez-faire theory could easily accommodate the notion of an end-
state distributive justice system. For example, while traditional so-
cial contract theory was premised on the idea of rights preexisting
the state,5 7 the DJV acknowledged the possibility of rights created
by the state. Similarly, while the laissez-faire theory was premised
on the primacy of the status quo,5 the DJV was premised on the
notion that the status quo was no longer necessarily desirable. As
a result, legitimizing the use of the DJV would require new efforts
to justify distributive justice within the liberal tradition. This cre-
ated,a second source of controversy and fostered some of the most
creative literature in modern political theory. These ranged from
Robert Nozick's frontal attack on the validity of end-state sys-
tems,59 to efforts by John Rawls, 0 Bruce Ackerman,61 and
53. See, e.g., R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTrH AMENDMENT (1977) (intent of framers version of social contract theory); Grey,
Origns of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in American Revolutionary Thought, 30
STAN. L. REV. 843 (1978) (natural rights theory); see also °Fushnet, A Note on the Revival of
Textualism in Constitutional Theory, 58 S. CAL L. REv. 683 (1985) (survey of use of textual-
ism). See generally LIBERAl. DEMOC ACY: NoMos XXV (J. Pennock &J. Chapman eds. 1983)
(general problems of interpreting meaning of liberalism in modern era).
54. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DiSrTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL RE:ViEW (1980).
55. See Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013
(1984) (developing theory of "constitutional" versus "normal" politics).
56. See, e.g., Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and
Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1983): Tushnet, The Dilemmas of Liberal Constitu-
tionalism, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 411 (1981): see also Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The
Essential Contradictions of Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE LJ. 1063 (1981).
57. See J. LOCKE, supra note 4, at 287-96, 303-20, 348-67.
58. See, e.g.; 2 J. MI.L, PRINCIPI.ES OF POLITICAL EcON6MY 558-603 (1874).
59. R. NOzICK, supra note 4.
60. J. RAWLS, supra note 46; see also infra note 137 (presupposed activist state in which
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others62 to establish theoretical frameworks for end-state versions
of liberalism, to the efforts of Roberto Unger to show the inability
of the orthodox liberal tradition to support such a transition.6"
A third and closely related legitimacy controversy centered
on efforts to develop a liberal theory of rights compatible with the
DJV. Just as the events of 1937 fostered debate about the legiti-
macy of a distributive justice form of liberalism, they also fostered
debate about the legitimacy of a theory of rights within the DJV.
Orthodox theory was premised on the existence of rights of au-
tonomy that preexisted the state. These rights tended to be exclu-
sive to their owner, associated with physical things, and uniform.
While such a theory of rights could function well in the decentral-
ized, individualistic setting of transactional justice, it could not
easily accommodate the political premises of the DJV.64 For exam-
ple, the emphasis in orthodox theory on exclusive rights rein-
forced the TJV notions of individual initiative and of trading be-
tween autonomous individuals.65 Yet this same feature of
orthodox theory made it difficult to accommodate either the DJV
concept that alterations might be necessary in the existing distri-
bution of wealth, even though it was attained by the proper appli-
cation of TJV standards, or that choices might have to be made
apart from the desires of individual will.6 6 Similarly, an emphasis
on uniform rights, although it reinforced the TJV notion of indi-
vidualism, made it difficult to accommodate the DJV concept that
because of existing deviations from end-state goals, rights requir-
ing affirmative action might attach to some groups or persons but
would not attach to others.6 7 In addition, the primacy of the status
rights derive from hypothetical contract involving veil of ignorance).
61. B. ACKERMAN, supra note 47: see also B. ACKERMAN, supra note 17, at 71-87 (Kant-
ian theory of takings jurisprudence): infra notes 139-40.
62. E.g., 0. FRIED, supra note 2; J. FISHKIN, JUSTICE, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, AND THE FAM-
n.y (1983): M. SANDFL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982); Dworkin, Liberalism,
in PurIi(: AND PRIVA MORAIrrY 113 (S. Hampshire ed. 1978); Shiffrin, Liberalism, Radi-
calism, and Legal Scholarship, 30 UCLA L. REV. 1103 (1983).
63. R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND PoLrrCS (1975).
64. For an excellent article on the different political structures implicit in the notion
that property consists of rights in things versus between people with respect to things, see
Grey, supra note 13.
65. See, e.g., R. NOZICK, supra note 4, at 160-64.
66. See, e.g., Shiffrin, supra note 62, at 1124-27.
67. See id. at 1127-30. This dilemma usually surfaces in arguments about the nature of
equality. See, e.g., Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare, 10 PHIL & PUB. AFF.
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quo and individual initiative in orthodox theory clashed with the
DJV concepts that the status quo was no longer necessarily valid,
and that initiative by the state in pursuance of end-state goals
(rather than merely the enforcement of individual wills) was no
longer suspect.
At the same time, not all aspects of the Hohfeldian concept of
rights were satisfactory. Viewing rights as between people with re-
spect to things was helpful initially because it reinforced the criti-
cal presuppositions of the DJV that affirmative action by the state
may be required to attain a just society, and that actions of the
state inevitably involved a series of conscious choices between va-
rious groups or strata in society.6 The Hohfeldian notion of
rights, however, was unable to address two critical aspects of a lib-
eral theory of individual rights in the DJV. First, it was unable to
supply the choice of affirmative goals for the state. The
Hohfeldian notion of rights facilitated the implementation of end-
state goals, but it could not, within its own framework, supply the
substance of those goals. Perceiving rights as existing between
people with respect to things helped to avoid the limitations that
the orthodoxy of exclusive rights placed on alteration of the status
quo, but it could not supply a positive theory of end-state princi-
ples. Second, it similarly could not provide a theory of limitations
on the state. 9 The Hohfeldian notion of rights had a positive side
because it allowed the creation of new rights by affirmative acts of
the state. However, it also had a negative side. If rights could be
created by the state, rights could also be destroyed by the state.
The Hohfeldian vision allowed rights to be a creation of the state,
but it did not prevent rights from existing at the whim of the
state. It allowed the intervention of the state to further end-state
goals, but it did not prevent the state from using that power to
intervene to a dangerous degree in the daily activities of its
citizens.
Thus, the Hohfeldian concept of rights helped to facilitate
185 (1981): Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL & PUB. AFF. 107 (1976).
68. This theme was a central feature in the literature of the Realists and helps to
explain some of their initial success, as well as their fall from grace after 1937. See White,
The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration: Jurisprudential Criticism and Social Change, 59 VA. L.
REV. 279, 280-85 (1973).
69. See, e.g., C. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM:
HOBBES TO LOCKE (1969); R. WOLFF, THE POVERTY OF LIBERALISM (1969) Singer, The Legal
Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence from Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 Wis. L. REV. 975.
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the emergence of the DJV by breaking down conceptual barriers
that prevented the realization of end-state goals actively pursued
by the state. However, it also created some problems for the im-
plementation of the DJV because it was unable to do what the
TJV did so well-provide a theory of individual rights.
Together, these offsetting deficiencies of the orthodox theory
of rights and the Hohfeldian theory of rights created another cri-
sis for modern political philosophy. The complete theory of rights
associated with the TJV could not accommodate the notion of an
activist state; yet the pure Hohfeldian concept of rights associated
with the DJV could not generate a satisfactory substantive theory
of individual rights against the state, a theory so prominent in the
liberal tradition. The ensuing responses of the scholars followed
much the same pattern of the other legitimacy controversies.
While some argued for a reaffirmation of orthodox complete
rights, 70 others attempted to reform the orthodox position to deal
with the DJV.71 While some attempted to develop a liberal con-
cept of rights for a distributive justice framework,72 others warned
of the inability of modern liberal theory to support a coherent
notion of rights and, as a result, the imminent collapse of law into
politics.73
B. Transition Issues
If 1937 represents the sanctioning of the use of the DJV,
then what is the present day legitimacy of the TJV? Prior to 1937
the TJV was accepted as legitimate, and the normative presup-
positions of the TJV became part of the institutionalized expecta-
tions of society. Based on the assumed legitimacy of the TJV, peo-
ple made transactions, acquired wealth, and rose or fell in society.
After 1937 the TJV was no longer necessarily accepted as valid.
1. Present Legitimacy of the Transactional Justice Vision. One
issue raised by this transition is the present day legitimacy of the
TJV. This, in turn, depends on which of several currently debated
interpretations of the events of 1937 is accepted.
One interpretation is to view the events of 1937 as reestab-
70. See, e.g., R. NozicK, supra note 4, at ix-xiv.
71. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHrs SERiousLY (1977); see also Meyers, Rights-
Based Rights, 3 LAW & PHIL 407 (1984).
72. See, e.g., B. ACKERMAN, supra note 47; J. RAWLS, supra note 46.
73, See, e.g., I'ushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REv. 1363 (1984).
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lishing or confirming the legitimacy of the TJV in certain areas.7'
Under this view, the events of 1937 would simultaneously be
viewed as reaffirming the legitimacy of the TJV in some areas and
legitimizing the use of the DJV in other areas. From this perspec-
tive, the TJV is entitled to as much legitimacy within its sphere as
the DJV is in its sphere.
An alternate interpretation is that the DJV is necessarily dom-
inant and that the TJV exists only at the sufferance of the DJV.
Under this reading, the events of 1937 would be viewed as a com-
plete shift, making the DJV the only legitimate political vision. 5
This would not necessarily mean that all traces of the TJV would
disappear, but only that the legitimacy and use of the TJV would
be tied to fulfilling some function in the DJV rather than any in-
dependent legitimacy of the TJV itself. For example, the TJV
might be used in areas where the status quo of the pre-1937 pe-
riod did not significantly diverge from the desired end-state goal
of the DJV .7 Alternatively, the TJV might be employed in areas
where it was judged the most effective, or the second-best method
to implement a goal according to DJV standards.7 In this case,
any argument that the TJV must be applied in particular areas
would have to be justified by reference to the DJV. The legiti-
macy of the TJV, therefore, would be based not on any indepen-
dent legitimacy of its own, but rather on that of the DJV.
74. For some initial efforts at the kind of argument that could support such a reading,
see Johnson, The Idea of Autonomy and the Foundations of Contractual Liability, 2 LAW & PHIL
271, 289-99 (1983). Some of Epstein's work is also susceptible to such a reading, see, e.g.,
Epstein, The Case of Antitrust, supra note 4; Epstein, Nuisance Law, supra note 4. This also
appears to be a possible reading of C. FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE (1981): and Wright,
Actual Causation vs. Probabilistic Linkage: The Bane of Economic Analysis, 14 J. LEGAL STUD,
435 (1985).
75. This seems to be the dominant theme in B. ACKERMAN, supra note 2, at 35-37; B.
ACKERMAN, supra note 17, at 183-84; G. CALABRESI, supra note 37; R. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW (2d ed. 1977); Kronman, Contract Law and DistributiveJustice, 89 YALE LJ.
472 (1980).
76. Cf Campisano, Ordinary Observing and Utilitarian Policymaking in the Internal Reve-
nue Code, 55 S. CAL L. REv. 785, 791 n.26 (1982) (implying substantive results may not
change after shift from one political system to a different one because of overlap of
results).
77. See, e.g., G. CALABRESI, supra note 37, at 307 (under certain conditions, fault system
may have done a good job of meeting end-state standards); Calabresi, Concerning Cause and
the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 U. CHI. L.'REv. 69 (1975) (TJV notions of
"but for" and "proximate cause" survive because they fulfill some of the needs of end-state
goals).
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A third interpretation is that the events of 1937 allowed the
ordinary political processes to choose between the TJV and the
DJV. From this perspective, no particular approval was necessarily
given to one vision over the other, and no one vision was necessa-
rily more legitimate than the other. The essence of this argument
is that during the Civil War-to-1937 period the TJV was taken as
given; but during the post-1937 period, either the TJV or the
DJV, separately or in combination, could be freely chosen for the
present political structure. Under this reading the TJV could be-
come legitimate in its own right, but only after it was chosen by
the ordinary political processes and not because the events of
1937 necessarily determined that it was any more, or any less, le-
gitimate than the DJV. Given this choice, it could be affirmed ei-
ther that after experimenting with the DJV, the TJV remained
the most desirable structure;78 or that even after choosing an end-
state program, the optimal one to select was one that incorporated
as many aspects of the TJV as possible. 9
2. Legitimacy of Transactional Justice Vision Rights Acquired
Prior to 1937. A second issue raised by the transition is the legiti-
macy of rights, wealth, and position acquired prior to 1937 in reli-
ance on the accepted legitimacy of the TJV. In other words, if the
events of 1937 amounted to a transition, do they also include a
theory of transition? Several interpretations are possible. First, the
DJV could only be applied prospectively to new arrangements.
Under this interpretation, new transactions would be subject to
the DJV. Until they took place, however, the existing or carryover
rights would be protected and could not be diminished for the
purposes of implementing new DJV goals. Thus, some interim pe-
riod of protection would exist. This, in essence, would be an argu-
ment that there was a theory of transition and that the DJV ap-
plied only to new transactions.
Second, it could be assumed that 1937 marked a new starting
78. This is another possible interpretation of Epstein's work. Cf supra note 74 and
accompanying text (alternative interpretation of Epstein's work as viewing the events of
1937 as confirming the legitimacy of the TJV in certain areas).
79. This is a possible interpretation of Posner's theory of wealth maximization. See
Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Lai Adjudication, 8
HoFST-RA LAw REV. 487, 503-06 (1980) [hereinafter Posner, Wealth Maximization II]; Pos-
ner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103, 130-36 (1979) [here-
inafter Posner, Wealth Maximization I]. Much of the deregulation movement associated with
law and economics could also be interpreted in this way.
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point and that the existing power in society was to be viewed
anew. Prior transactions and existing wealth were no longer nec-
essarily legitimate. This would not mean that existing rights were
necessarily invalid, but only that they had to be legitimated ac-
cording to prevailing DJV standards. Under this interpretation
1937 represented a clear demarcation. Until 1937 events were
judged according to the TJV, but after 1937 events would be
judged according to the DJV. Under this reading, there would be
no transition period. All existing distributions of power would be
subject to possible use for DJV goals. This amounts to an interpre-
tation that there was no theory of transition, and that existing dis-
tributions were subject to possible modification, but only for the
pursuance of new DJV goals.
Third, it could be assumed that the events of 1937 were not
merely the start of a new era (as the second interpretation would
suggest), but that they were also meant to undo what amounted to
the accumulated errors of the TJV under current standards. This,
for example, is a possible interpretation of affirmative action. 80
Existing distributions would not only be subject to possible use for
new DJV concerns, but also for rectifying the past problems of the
TJV. This would be an interpretation that there was no theory of
transition, but that there was a theory of retribution and that ex-
isting rights were subject to rearrangement not only for new DJV
goals, but also for the undoing of what, under current DJV stan-
dards, were the old errors of the TJV. This reading suggests that
current distributions would be subject to possible change for a
greater range of concerns. While under both this and the previous
reading the DJV would be applied prospectively, in the previous
case completed transactions would not be subject to redistribution
except for new DJV principles. However, under this reading they
would, in addition, be subject to redistribution for rectifying per-
ceived errors of the TJV.
C. Boundary Issues
A final area of controversy is the relationship between the
TJV and the DJV. Unless an extreme position is taken, both the
TJV and the DJV would, in some fashion, continue to coexist.
80. See EQUAITrY AND PREF-R-N'iAL TREATMENT (M. Cohen, T. Nagel & T. Scanlon
eds. 1977).
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The interplay between the two systems raises a series of what
could be termed boundary controversies.
The first boundary controversy addresses the issue of where
to set the boundary between the TJV and the DJV. Once it is
assumed that the TJV and the DJV can, or should, coexist in some
configuration, then boundaries must be marked out between
them. One type of dispute would be expected to center on the
relative dominance of each. Some people, for example, might ar-
gue for an expansive DJV while others may argue for an expan-
sive version of the TJV. In a related fashion, another type of dis-
pute would center on the choice of areas subject to each vision.
Even after a determination is made about the relative dominance
of each vision, it still must be determined which vision will govern
which areas. For example, even if it is assumed that the DJV
should be dominant relative to the TJV, some might argue that
the DJV should apply in the marketplace and the TJV should ap-
ply to the social structure. In contrast, others might argue that the
TJV should apply to the market and the DJV to the social
structure.
A second boundary controversy concerns coordinating the
operation of the two visions. An assumed coexistence of the two
visions makes it necessary to deal with the possibility of overlap
between them. Each vision has its own structure and its own asso-
ciated values. As a result, their coexistence may not always be
without difficulty. Each may reinforce the other in some respect,
but each is more likely to conflict with the other. One problem
arising out of their coexistence is the delineation of standards for
resolving conflicts between the two visions. This can be viewed as
a problem of policing the boundaries set up between the two
visions.8'
This catalogue of issues involving the various legitimacy and
boundary issues concerning the meaning of the events of 1937 is
admittedly brief, and the questions it raises are complex. To un-
derstand why the Coase theorem is controversial, however, it is
not necessary to accept any particular position with respect to any
of these issues. It is only necessary to recognize that such matters
are currently perceived as important ones for the legal culture,
and that they are controversial because they are central to the le-
81. See, e.g., B. ACKERMAN, supra note 2, at 35-37 & n.8.
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gitimacy of modern political philosophy. Given this background,
the special role that the Coase theorem plays in introducing these
issues to the legal culture can now be sketched out.
IV. POLITICAL VISIONS AND THE COASE THEOREM
Given the end-state structure of the Coase theorem and the
political structure of the events of 1937, three different sources of
controversy can be isolated. First, the Coase theorem forces the
legal culture to consider the TJV political foundations of its past
and, ultimately, to question the autonomy of the law. Second, the
theorem forces the legal culture to consider the political structure
and substantive issues associated with the DJV. This is controver-
sial not only because it presents the legal culture with a concept of
rights, a theory of disputes, and a role for the state at odds with
the implicit political perspective of conventional legal thought,
but also because the DJV is a controversial political proposition in
its own right. Third, the political structure of the Coase theorem
reflects the political structure of the events of 1937. As a result, it
serves a special proxy function. It forces the legal culture to con-
front (in the guise of the Coase theorem) some of the difficult
questions of modern political philosophy. Some of the criticisms
of the Coase theorem can be understood as merely mirroring
some of the philosophical concerns associated with the events of
1937.
A. The Coase Theorem and the Transactional Justice Vi-
sion-Realization of the Politics of the Past and the Politics of the Law
When presented with the Coase theorem, the legal culture is
presented with the DJV in a pure form. Within the Coasean
framework, the legitimacy of the DJV is unquestioned, its range is
complete, and its tolerance of the TJV is minimal. The legal cul-
ture is therefore presented with a structure that challenges the
political foundations of classical common-law thought.
During the Civil War-to-1937 period, a transactional justice
political structure provided the framework for the development of
classical common-law thought. 2 During this period, the legitimacy
82. Gjerdingen, The Future of Legal Scholarship and the Search for a Modern Theory of
Law, 35 BUFFALO L. Riv. 381 (1986).
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of the basic TJV was taken for granted. Within this structure, the
role of the legal culture was essentially threefold. First, the legal
culture reinforced the tenets of transactional justice."3 Questions
that challenged the legitimacy of transactional justice were not
taken seriously, and issues that were not germane to transactional
justice were not relevant. Second, in the process of working with
and institutionalizing the TJV, the legal culture answered the
hard questions generated by the TJV."4 These hard questions
might involve such matters as the exact form of the TJV, the mar-
ginal application of accepted principles, or the conflict between
such principles. Both significant and trivial decisions had to be
made, and the legal culture played a prominent role in making
them. Third, the legal culture administered and resolved the his-
torically focused types of disputes which would be expected to be
generated in a transactional justice system. 5 Concurrently, the le-
gal culture presented its work as an autonomous and neutral sci-
ence, free from the taint of politics.8 6
The TJV, therefore, came to serve as the organizing political
principle of an entire generation of lawyers. It animated their
work, it structured their dialogue, and it provided their legiti-
macy. Most importantly, it represented some of their most funda-
mental (and hence unspoken) assumptions about the law. As the
legal culture adopted techniques and substantive doctrine to rein-
force this structure, the political notions of transactional justice
became firmly embedded in the substantive and procedural law of
the period. The TJV fostered classical common-law thought and
the substantive categories and techniques of classical common-law
thought, in turn, implicitly carried with them the political struc-
ture of the TJV. As a result, the core features of transactional
justice and its theory of disputes, rights, and the state became an
implicit feature of legal consciousness during the Civil War-to-
1937 period.
The appearance of the Coase theorem, however, forced the
83. Id. at 428-32.
84. Id. at 425-26.
85. Id. at 426, 429-30.
86. See, e.g., J. REDUICH, THE COMMON LAW AND THE CASE METHOD IN AMERICAN UNI-
vIRsrr LAW SCHOOlS (1914): Nelson, The Impact of the Antislavery Movement Upon Styles of
Judicial Reasoning in Nineteenth Century America, 87 HARV. L. REV. 513 (1974). The locus
classicus is C. LANCGDEI. A SELExrrION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS viii (2d ed. 1879).
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legal culture to confront the political foundations of its past. Ini-
tially, the theorem was almost universally perceived as alien, in-
correct, and not law. From the standpoint of classical legal
thought, the facts of the Coase theorem presented an easy case.87
The rancher's cows entered the farmer's area of control without
justification and caused damage. Applying conventional legal anal-
ysis and its implicit TJV perspective, the rancher would clearly be
held responsible.88 In contrast, the Coase theorem held that this
87. See, e.g., Page v. Hollingsworth, 7 Ind. 317 (1855) (analysis of cows straying on
adjoining corn field from perspective of common-law thought). This approach has a vener-
able tradition. See Exodus 22:5 (KingJames) ("If a man shall cause a field or vineyard to be
eaten, and shall put in his beast, and shall feed in another man's field; of the best of his
own field, and of the best of his own vineyard, shall he make restitution."). The same,
however, has been said for the Coase theorem. See Liebermann, The Coase Theorem in Jewish
Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 293 (1981) (argues similarity exists between Coase and Jewish law
in treatment of social cost).
88. From the perspective of the TJV, it is already assumed that the rancher and the
farmer have certain preexisting rights. As an irreducible part of their existence as persons,
both the rancher and the farmer are assumed to possess the natural right to their own
bodies and the fruits of their labors. These rights are not a matter of legislative grace, but
preexist the state.
As another aspect of their existence as persons, both the rancher and the farmer are
entitled to exercise autonomy over what they own, and to interact with other persons on
the basis of mutual consent. The rancher and the farmer are assumed to have an autono-
mous sphere of protection delimited and physicalized by the boundaries of their property.
Within their respective spheres, the rancher and the farmer exercise complete physical
dominion. Fach may independently choose what activity takes place in his sphere, and may
complain if it is violated. For example, the rancher may choose to raise cows and, if so,
what types of cows to raise and how to raise them. Similarly, he is free to farm, to engage
in some other activity, or even to let the land lay fallow. Each may also exercise physical
dominion over his area. The area itself is marked off and defined by physical boundaries.
Dominion is complete, since neither has to share his realm with anyone else.
Another aspect of their separate autonomy is control over agreements with other per-
sons. Fach is assumed to be able to sell his property at a price that is agreeable to himself.
Similarly, each may, as an exercise of his autonomy, refuse any offer regardless of how
favorable the terms.
In addition, events are assumed to take place against a fixed background of entitle-
ments. So long as each has acquired his holdings by historically correct moves, the present
boundaries and distribution of property are assumed to be correct. As a result, the status
quo defines the preferred state of affairs.
From this perspective, given the facts of the Coase theorem, the important act is the
boundary crossing by the rancher's cows. The rancher (through one of his possessions)
invaded the preexisting physicalized sphere of autonomy of the farmer, thereby interfering
with the exclusive dominion of the farmer over that sphere. The violation is complete at
the precise moment the cows cross the farmer's boundary. Since the rancher caused the
boundary crossing, the farmer may ask that the move be justified.
The farmer is assumed to be able to protect his autonomy and to complain when it is
violated by others. Similarly, the rancher is assumed to be able to explain the violation.
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answer was no longer necessarily correct.89 This created a sense of
crisis for the legal culture. On the one hand, common-law thought
was accepted as the dominant, if not the exclusive, method of le-
gal analysis. Its legitimacy was unquestioned. On the other hand,
given an easy case, the Coase theorem generated a wrong answer.
As a result, the legal culture had to defend common-law thought
and the TJV.
This conflict gave rise to a spirited and far-ranging debate
about the nature of common-law thought. In the process, the le-
gal culture ultimately was forced to reconsider the political foun-
dations of classical common-law thought. The response of the le-
gal culture followed several distinct stages. At first, the theorem
was treated as merely a special application of economics to com-
mon-law thought.90 From this perspective, the theorem was
merely a continuation of the Realist plea to refine legal thought
by using the insights of other disciplines into human behavior.91
Under this interpretation, no conflict existed between the theo-
rem and the autonomy of common-law thought. The theorem was
The farmer controls whether a dispute is brought, and, if so, how it is maintained. The
merits of the dispute are decided by reference to the substance of the rights of the farmer.
The farmer has a right because it is assumed that he has preexisting rights of autonomy. It
is a personal right of the farmer, and is assumed to be physicalized and marked off by the
boundaries of his property. As a result, he has rights in the thing (i.e., the land). Who may
complain about the boundary crossing and who must answer are defined by the right. Only
the owner of the right, the farmer, may initiate the complaint, and only the person who
caused the physical boundary crossing, the rancher, can be made to answer.
89. See Coase, supra note 1, at 2. As Coase stated it:
The question is commonly thought of as one in which A inflicts harm on B and
what has to be decided is: how should we restrain A? But this is wrong. We are
dealing with a problem of a reciprocal nature. To avoid the harm to B would
inflict harm on A. The real question that has to be decided is: should A be
allowed to harm B or should B be allowed to harm A? The problem is to avoid
the more serious harm.... [An] example is afforded by the problem of straying
cattle which destroy crops on neighboring land. If it is inevitable that some
cattle will stray, an increase in the supply of meat can only be obtained at the
expense of a decrease in the supply of crops. The nature of the choice is clear:
meat or crops.
Id.
90. See, e.g., The Fire of Truth: A Remembrance of Law and Economics at Chicago, 1932-
1970, 26 J.L. & EcoN. 163 (1983); see also Cooter, Law and the Imperialism of Economics: An
Introduction to the Economic Analysis of Law and a Review of the Major Books, 29 UCLA L. REV.
1260 (1982). To some extent the initial form of the theorem, as one involving common-law
adjudication, also reinforced this.
91. See, e.g., White, From Sociological Jurisprudence to Realism: Jurisprudence and Social
Change in Early Twentieth-Century America, 58 VA. L. REV. 999, 1013-26 (1972).
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merely a permissible source of insight. To the extent that the the-
orem provided a more precise measure of accepted common-law
standards of reasonable behavior, its economic insights were use-
ful. The legal culture was free to make use of economics, just as it
was free to make use of other disciplines, such as psychology or
logic, so long as it was not controlled by them.92 Similarly, to the
extent that the theorem did not reinforce the common law, it
could be dismissed as an interesting but non-binding economic
principle that did not pose a threat to the autonomy of the law.
The Coase theorem, however, did not disappear. Shortly af-
ter its introduction, it became the keystone of the law and eco-
nomics movement. The critique of the relationship between com-
mon-law thought and the Coase theorem reached a second level
of analysis. At the heart of the law and economics movement was
an assumption that law had been, and still was, an application of
economic efficiency. 93 That is, that common-law thought was re-
ally economic thought. This changed the analysis in several re-
spects. First, it challenged the traditional assumption that the law
was autonomous. The law and economics argument, in essence,
was that law necessarily was an application of economics rather
than economics being a permissible complement to law. Second,
the Coase theorem began to be treated as an end-state proposi-
tion. Led by Calabresi 9 4 and Posner,95 law and economics began to
take on the status of a distributive justice proposition. Criticism of
the theorem centered on the politics of economics. Critics of the
law and economics movement argued about the normative
problems inherent in the structure of law and economics, its con-
cept of rights,9" and why it was less morally acceptable than con-
92. For an example of this position see Pound, The Economic Interpretation and the Law
of Torts, 53 HARV. L. REv. 365 (1940).
93. See, e.g., R. POSNER, supra note 75, at 27-191; Posner, The Economic Approach to
Law, 53 TF:x. L. RF:v. 757 (1975).
94. See, e.g., G. CAI.ABRFSI, supra note 37; Calabresi, supra note 38: Calabresi & Me-
lamed, supra note 2.
95. Some of the best examples of this are Posner, Book Review, 37 U. Cm. L. REv. 636
(1970) (review of Calabresi's work); Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL, SrUD. 29
(1972) (argues negligence during 1875-1905 period explained by efficiency); Posner, Strict
Liability: A Comment, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 205 (1973); Posner, Epstein's Tort Theory: A Critique, 8
J. LEGAL Srun. 457 (1979) (distinguishes his position from Epstein's transactional justice
theory).
96. See, e.g., 0. FRIED, supra note 3, at 81-107 (1978): Baker, The Ideology of the Eco-
nomic Analysis of Law, 5 PHIL & Pun. Arr. 3 (1975): Polinsky, Economic Analysis as a Poten-
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ventional legal analysis.97
The attack on the political foundation of law and economics,
however, marked a turning point in the debate about the relation-
ship between the theorem and common-law thought.98 Once the
debate shifted to the politics of law and economics and once law
was no longer necessarily viewed as autonomous, then discussion
of the politics of common-law thought could not be far behind. In
particular, efforts to attack the end-state aspects of the theorem
helped to sharpen the dialogue about the political foundations of
common-law thought. Two very different strands of recent schol-
arship converged, both of which stressed a close relationship be-
tween common-law thought and the TJV. On one side was the
conservative position of Epstein. He attacked the end-state politi-
cal structure of the theorem as politically unacceptable, and ar-
gued for the continuation of the TJV. 9 On the other side was the
leftist position of members of the Critical Legal Studies (CLS)
movement, who attacked the theorem (and law and economics
generally) as a politically unacceptable reincarnation of the
TJV.100 Significantly, however, both groups agreed that the TJV
tially Defective Product: A Buyer's Guide to Posner's Economic Analysis of Law, 87 HARV. L.
RF:v. 1655 (1974): see also Symposium on Efficiency as a Legal Concern, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 485
(1980): Markovits, Legal Analysis and the Economic Analysis of Allocative Efficiency, 8 HOFSTRA
L. RtV. 811 (1980).
97. See, e.g., Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L.
REv. 451 (1974): Tribe, Policy Science: Analysis or Ideology?, 2 PHIL & PUB. AFF. 66 (1972).
98. Posner's theory of wealth maximization certainly marked the beginning of a new
level of dialogue. Until this point, most of the use of economics had been based on some
type of claim about economics as a social science, see, e.g., Posner, Book Review, 37 U. Cm:
L. RE:v. 636, 637-38 (1970). By the time he proposed his theory of wealth maximization,
however, Posner had turned to normative political arguments. See Posner, Wealth Maximiza-
tion 1, supra note 79 (presentation of wealth maximization as ethical theory, along with
comparison to utilitarianism): Posner, Wealth Maximization II, supra note 79 (political argu-
ment based on consent as well as direct comparison to other political theories such as that
by Rawls and utilitarianism). Much of the response to Posner's theory was also political and
normative. See Symposium on Efficiency as a Legal Concern, supra note 96: Markovits, supra
note 96.
Equally significant was the work of Jules Coleman. He was one of the first scholars to
draw attention to the ethical foundations of economic analysis itself as well as to expose the
political incompleteness of Posner's proposal, see Coleman, supra note 23: Coleman, Effi-
ciency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 509 (1980) [hereinafter Efficiency];
Coleman, supra note 22.
99. Epstein, supra note 23. By challenging the Coase theorem as an end-state proposi-
tion and proposing an alternative theory of torts based on corrective justice, Epstein helped
to draw attention to the political structure of common-law thought.
100. See, e.g.,. Horwitz, supra note 2. As Horwitz notes:
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was connected with common-law thought, even though they vehe-
mently disagreed about the present day merits of the TJV.
These insights led to a third level of analysis-the political
nature of common-law thought. Most of the commentary on the
politics of law and economics had necessarily denied the autonomy
of the law. However, most of the commentary had also taken a
single political perspective. For example, Posner viewed both
classical common-law thought and the Coase theorem as part of a
single theory of economic efficiency. °1 Similarly, while Epstein as-
sociated the common law with the TJV, he also argued for the
continuation of the TJV and the denial of the DJV.102 Finally, the
CLS members associated common-law thought and the Coase the-
orem with the TJV, and argued for the rejection of both.10 3 The
events of 1937, however, suggest another interpretation of the in-
terplay between the theorem and the political foundation of com-
mon-law thought. 4 Once the events of 1937 are considered, a
dual political perspective can be offered. This perspective suggests
that common-law thought represents the TJV that dominated
American politics in the Civil War-to-1937 era, while the Coase
theorem represents the DJV that was legitimated in 1937.105
From this perspective, the interplay between common-law thought
ILlurking behind Coase's model was a major inarticulate premise about what
was "natural" and "normal" in society. Freedom of contract was the norm. De-
partures from bargaining were aberrational and would only be justifiable when
high transaction costs made the bargain inefficient.
Indeed, Coase's theorem was the perfect ideological ally to the economist's
paradigm of a competitive market occasionally made "imperfect" by monopolis-
tic competition. By placing contract both logically and normatively prior to
tort, it shifted the burden of persuasion back to those who would justify
intervention.
Id. at 908.
101. Posner does not distinguish between the political structure of the Civil War-to-
1937 period and the modern era. In his view, economic efficiency not only was an accurate
description of what the common law was, but also a statement of what current doctrine
should be. See Landes & Posner, The Positive Economic Theory of Tort Law, 15 GA. L. REv.
851, 852-57, 863, 916-20 (1980).
102. See, e.g., Epstein, The Case of Antitrust, supra note 4 (argument for application of
corrective justice principles to antitrust).
103. See infra notes 135-36 and accompanying text.
104. This is suggested by B. ACKERMAN, supra note 2, at 23-71, Mashaw, supra note 4;
see also Stewart, supra note 19 (traditional model of law contrasted with model of "interest
representation"): Sunstein, Deregulation and the Hard-Look Doctrine, 1983 Sup, CT. RF;v. 177
(model of public law contrasted with private law).
105. See Gjerdingen, supra note 82, at 422-35.
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and the Coase theorem is controversial not because they represent
the same political theory, but rather because they represent two
different ones. Thus, when the legal culture is confronted with
the different structure of the theorem, it is forced to consider the
political foundations of its past. In the process of defending why
the theorem cannot be right, the legal culture in turn is forced to
contrast the Coase theorem with the transactional justice founda-
tions of their professionally trained intuitions. In a sense, it is as if
the political basis of conventional legal analysis was not obvious
until it was removed. Once the Coase theorem took it away, the
legal culture could sense that a fundamental change had been
made, but it had a difficult time locating the source of that
change. In retrospect, the theorem created a sense of crisis be-
cause it removed the political foundations of classical common-law
thought. The assumptions of the TJV-autonomy, spheres of
control, and moves between people-were no longer controlling.
As a result, common-law analysis could no longer work because
the political structure that gave rise to it was no longer present.
Common-law thought could no longer produce correct answers
because the kinds of questions that it was designed to answer were
no longer being asked and were no longer assumed to be relevant.
Only when conventional legal analysis no longer worked was the
legal culture forced to consider what the political foundation of
conventional legal analysis and the claims of autonomy were all
about.
B. The Coase Theorem and the Distributive Justice Vision-Exposure
to the Possible Politics of the Future
1. The Distributive Justice Vision and the Legal Culture-In
General. While the pure DJV nature of the theorem helps the
legal culture to become aware of its historical ties to the TJV, it
also helps the legal culture to confront the nature of its possible
future-the DJV. The constitutional events of 1937 ended the
unqualified acceptance of the TJV and legitimated the use of the
DJV. 06 End-state principles were no longer automatically viewed
106. Historically, this shift first manifested itself in the area of economic regulation in
the 1930s and 1940s. See, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391-400
(1937). The Parrish opinion presupposes (1) that the state may regulate the market; (2) that
class legislation is no longer invalid: (3) that the state may redistribute wealth; (4) that the
state may change bargaining power: and (5) that the existing social structure (in this case,
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as suspect and were continually being debated in a growing num-
ber of contexts. It has become increasingly commonplace to ques-
tion the legitimacy of the existing distribution of wealth, power,
and position in society, and to propose end-state goals to replace
the status quo. As a result, the DJV (along with its attendant the-
ory of rights and the state) has taken on increased prominence.
For example, the increased scrutiny over the last thirty years of
the use of race, gender, age, and other factors as criteria in deci-
sion making, serves as a prominent example of the influence and
range of the DJV. Much of the dispute about the use of these
criteria implicitly centers on the conflict between two different
views of society.1"' At one extreme are those who choose to treat
discrimination within a modified TJV framework. They assume it
involves individual acts of wrongdoing by perpetrators which the
state is required to redress only upon application of an injured
party.0 " At the other extreme are those who treat discrimination
as a problem within the DJV. They assume that it involves a social
condition which deviates unacceptably from substantive end-state
goals involving distribution of power in society, and which the
state, accordingly, has an affirmative duty to remedy.10 9 The appli-
cation of the DJV in the area of discrimination has received vary-
ing degrees of support."' Some groups have made strong argu-
ments for the adoption of end-state principles (such as the use of
quotas or disparate impact analysis) based on particular substan-
tive end-state visions of a just society. 1 In some areas these argu-
the place of women) is subject to scrutiny.
In the last several decades, however, it expanded beyond the marketplace to the social
structure as well. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (social role of women); Gra-
ham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (caste system with respect to aliens); Levy v. Loui-
siana, 391 U.S. 68 (1967) (caste system with respect to illegitimates); Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533 (1964) (validity of existing structure of political power); Brown v. Board of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483 (1954) (validity of social structure).
107. A good introduction to the nature of the problem is Freeman, Antidiscrimination
Law: A Critical Review, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 96 (D. Kairys ed. 1982) [hereinafter PoL]r-
IC OF LAw I.
108. See Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A
Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REv. 1049, 1052-57 (1978).
109. See id. at 1073-78.
110. See Freeman, supra note 108; Fiss, School Desegregation: The Uncertain Path of the
Law, 4 PHI. & PUB. AFF. 3 (1974).
111. A pure disparate impact approach is certainly an unduly simplistic theory. See,
e.g., Goodman, De Facto School Segregation: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis, 60 CALIF.
L. REv. 1183 (1972). However, the disparate impact standard is significant because it serves
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ments have succeeded; in others they have not." 2 What is of pri-
mary importance, however, is that the DJV is a concept that
increasingly must be confronted in some fashion, if only to dispute
or modify it.
Similar trends are evident with respect to the distribution and
exercise of power in such areas as the workplace, the family, and
the government itself. Recent debates about economic regulation
have also centered on the use of such end-state standards as
wealth maximization or cost-benefit analysis.' Even the physical
environment is no longer immune from the influence of the DJV.
During the last twenty years, the world around us, as well as the
places in which we work, have been increasingly perceived as less
clean or safe. As a result, affirmative end-state standards of safety
or cleanliness have been proposed. Ix4
The existence of such trends is accepted doctrine. The impor-
tant point is not to attempt to delimit the variations in which the
DJV appears in dialogue discussing the modern American political
structure. Instead, it is important to note that the DJV, while at
times controversial, is no longer automatically dismissed as illegiti-
mate, and that the areas in which the DJV is debated are
expanding.
The DJV, therefore, is a significant part of the future of the
legal culture. The political structure that supports it and the con-
troversies that surround it have become an increasingly prominent
part of American political life. Perhaps most importantly, the DJV
is an unknown part of our future. Just as the dominance of the
TJV during the Civil War-to-1937 period required a realignment
as a placeholder for rights linked to some kind of end-state vision of society.
112. Compare Mayor of Washington, D.C. v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (disparate
racial impact alone does not establish violation of constitutional standards of equal protec-
tion) with Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (disparate impact sufficient to
establish prima facie violation of Title VII).
113. The increased use of cost-benefit analysis raises a host of significant normative
questions. See, e.g., Rogers, Benefits, Costs, and Risks. Oversight at Health and Environmental
Decision Making, 4 HARV. ENVrI L. REv. 191 (1980); Williams, Benefit-Cost Analysis in Natu-
ral Resources Decisionmaking: An Economic and Legal Overview, I 1 NAT. RESOURCES J. 761
(1979). The use of wealth maximization as an end-state principle to guide government con-
duct certainly is not without support. Compare Posner, supra note 79, with Exec. Order No.
12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. 601 app. at 431-34 (1982) (mandating
use of cost-benefit analysis by agencies).
114. See, e.g., Clean Air Act § 109, 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (1982) (mandates setting of na-
tional air quality standards).
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of the legal culture, the emergence of the DJV in the post-1937
era raised the spectre of an equally significant realignment. The
legal culture would be positioned to reinforce the legitimacy of
the DJV, to answer the questions it makes important, and to re-
solve its disputes.
Because the political structure of the theorem is one of pure
distributive justice, it also forces the legal culture to consider the
nature of the DJV. This is done in two mutually supporting ways.
First, the theorem forces the legal culture to consider the general
nature of the DJV. Second, it also forces the legal culture to deal
with the major substantive issues of the DJV.
2. The Theorem and the Existence of the Distributive Justice Vi-
sion. The Coase theorem was the first scholarly device that suc-
ceeded in presenting the DJV to the legal culture. 1 5 Matters of
distributive justice had been dealt with by the legal culture prior
to the Coase theorem only because lawyers had to function in the
reality of post-1937 politics. Prior to the theorem, however, the
legal culture had been spared a direct confrontation with the
DJV. Since classical legal thought was based on the TJV it was
unable to directly confront the issues of the DJV. Some of the
greatest controversies about the legitimacy of the DJV did not ma-
ture until the late 1960s and 1970s. As a result, initially there was
no perceived crisis. Conventional legal techniques could be re-
worked, and discussion of distributive justice could be safely ex-
iled to the domain of politics rather than law. What was special
about the Coase theorem was not only that it presented the DJV
in a pure, simple form, but also that it did so in a fashion initially
compatible with the demands of classical common-law thought.
Moreover, it did so at a time when dialogue about the role of the
DJV in modern politics began to take on particular importance.
Rather than dealing with isolated aspects of the DJV, the
Coase theorem presents it in a pure form. It presents it com-
pletely, and in a unified manner. The Coase theorem represents a
very special kind of thought experiment. The Coasean perspective
presents a world of pure distributive justice. The TJV, for all
practical purposes, no longer has any special claim to legitimacy.
115. There were other attempts. See, e.g., Lasswell & McDougal, Criteria for a Theory
About Law, 44 S. CAL L. REv. 362 (1971)- Lasswell & McDougal, Legal Education and Public
Policy: Professional Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE LJ. 203 (1943).
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Transactional justice, complete rights, and the notion of a limited
state no longer exist. The very use of the theorem has already
selected the DJV as the appropriate political framework. And
thus, the theorem has become an easy symbol for a complex idea.
The easy facts of the cows and the corn play the role of political
parable. They serve as a mediation device between the political
presuppositions of the DJV and the realities of its application. The
story of the cows and the corn simultaneously carries with it the
essential political structure of the DJV and a particular application
of the vision.
It is equally significant that the theorem accomplished this by
using the standard unit of common-law thought-the case. This
served a dual function. First, it eased the assimilation of the theo-
!rem into the legal culture. Next, once accepted, it provided an
easy way to contrast the structure and demands of the DJV with
those of the TJV. The fact situation first used to illustrate the
theorem (cattle straying on adjoining crop land) would not create
any problems for a legal culture deeply indoctrinated in the dy-
namics of the TJV and classical common-law thought. The cows
and the corn provided a fact pattern that lent itself easily to tradi-
tional TJV analysis. The very description of the facts-the cows
crossing a boundary and causing damage-provided an easy and
thus non-threatening transactional justice statement of the facts.
This helped to present the theorem as if it were merely a variant
of conventional legal technique (i.e., just another way for com-
mon-law courts to deal with common-law cases)."' 6 At the same
time, the use of a case also provided a convenient way to contrast
the structure of the DJV to that of the TJV. To a legal culture
trained to analyze a case in transactional justice terms, the presen-
tation of the DJV in the form of a case could only serve to high-
light the contrasting structures and theories of the two visions.
3. The Theorem and the Substantive Questions of the Distributive
Justice Vision. The Coase theorem also systematically forces the
legal culture to consider some of the central concerns of the DJV.
Just as the TJV has certain issues that its structure makes more
important than others (such as delimiting boundaries and specify-
116. The fact that economics was initially presented as a neutral social science also




ing permissible moves), the DJV has a competing set of issues that
it makes important. Within the structure of the DJV, dialogue
turns from permissible moves and complete rights to end-state
goals and Hohfeldian rights. The Coase theorem is not necessarily
a tool of conservatism, but it is a tool of the DJV. It does not
require that particular answers be given to the questions it raises,
but it does require that certain questions be addressed.
For example, in the DJV the legitimacy of the existing distri-
bution of wealth is no longer taken for granted. Merely because
the existing distribution of wealth may have been attained by his-
torically correct moves does not necessarily mean that it is just.
Thus, once it is assumed that the DJV is to be applied, it becomes
necessary to develop dialogue about when redistribution of wealth
is permissible or desirable. Moreover, to function within such a
political framework, the legal culture must be able to help isolate
those issues and to develop some of the necessary dialogue. In a
complimentary fashion, the Coase theorem cannot be applied
without explicitly dealing with the matter of wealth distribu-
tion.11 If no transaction costs are assumed, the Coase theorem
merely states that economic efficiency is indifferent about the ini-
tial placement of legal liability. A Pareto optimal result is gener-
ated regardless of whether the initial entitlement is given to the
rancher or to the farmer. Rather than mandating a particular re-
sult, economic efficiency creates a stalemate. Nonetheless, this is
an important stalemate. One person necessarily must be made
117. Although this point was merely implicit in Coase's earlier work, it has been devel-
oped in subsequent commentary on the Coase theorem. As one commentator has phrased
it:
The traditional understanding of Coase's theorem might be summarized as
follows: allocative efficiency, or the maximum productive use of resources, does
not depend on the initial assignment of entitlements. The initial assignment is
only the starting point from which negotiations begin. The point at which ne-
gotiations cease represents the efficient allocation of resources. The initial as-
signment of entitlements, however, does affect the relative wealth of the com-
peting parties simply because the assignment determines which party has to do
the purchasing (or what economists misleadingly call "bribing").
Coleman, supra note 23, at 225: see also Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 2, at 1095-96,
1098-99 (advocates conferring legal entitlements on the basis of their wealth distribution
effects): Kennedy, supra note 2, at 422-44 (wealth effects of placement of entitlements).
This includes several kinds of wealth distribution questions, including background entitle-
ments, see, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 2, at 422-29: and offer-asking choice, id. at 401-13, as
well as choosing, once given these other answers, which person gets the specific entitlement
considered. See also Baker, supra note 96, at 7-27 (wealth impact of choice of entitlement).
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wealthier, the other poorer. If the Coase theorem is to be applied
at this point, additional normative dialogue must be generated.
Before the rancher or the farmer can be favored, explicit refer-
ence must be made to some other normative framework such as
utilitarianism, social contract theory, or natural rights. Signifi-
cantly, the Coase theorem itself does not require that any particu-
lar answer be given. It does require, however, that some answer
be given. Thus, it forces those who use the theorem to confront
both the issue of wealth distribution and the larger normative is-
sues the theorem implies.
The theorem itself does not require particular answers, but it
does require that other topics be considered. For example, even
though it does not entail a theory of merit or wealth distribution,
it does require that one be considered. This raises the option of
attempting to justify the results by explicit reference to the politi-
cal events of 1937, rather than just by reference to abstract no-
tions of fairness or general political theory. Similarly, other disci-
plines consistent with the political arguments chosen may also be
used. As a consequence, this further undermines the conventional
assumption that the law is autonomous. Thus, while the theorem
does not deny that legal argument is different from other disci-
plines, it does mandate some interdisciplinary discourse.
In a similar fashion, the Coase theorem also forces considera-tion of other issues, including the social structure, methods of reg-
ulating the market, and social choice techniques."" Thus, the the-
orem serves as a useful device to force the legal culture to develop
dialogue about some of the significant issues of the DJV.
C. The Coase Theorem and the Events of 1937-the Politics of the
Present
Much of the future of American law depends on how the
events of 1937 are interpreted. Since the orthodox theories that
dominated American political thought for the last two hundred
years are unable to give meaning to those events, there is a sense
118. In this sense, the theorem serves as a useful bridge to a growing number of disci-
plines. For example, if the term "no transaction costs" is taken seriously, the Coase theo-
rem could be interpreted as asking what would result if all parties involved could achieve a




of crisis."' The events of 1937 set out controversial questions, de-
mand controversial responses, and guarantee only controversial
answers.
The Coase theorem, because of its special relationship to
those events, can only do the same. This section considers the spe-
cial role the Coase theorem plays in forcing the legal culture to
focus on and to develop dialogue about these concerns. An argu-
ment is made that the Coase theorem is a convenient and signifi-
cant thought experiment that forces the legal culture to confront
questions about the TJV and DJV that are such an important part
of modern political philosophy. Once viewed from this perspec-
tive, much of the dispute about the Coase theorem can be re-
duced to arguments about the questions of political philosophy
that the theorem carries with it.
The theorem does this in two different ways. First, it satisfies
the general requirements of dialogue required by the events of
1937. This could be termed the procedural aspect of the theorem.
Second, many of the disputes about the theorem reflect the influ-
ence of the particular political controversies arising out of the
events of 1937. This could be termed the substantive aspect of the
theorem. Each of these aspects will be discussed.
1. The Procedural Aspects of the Coase Theorem and the Events
of 1937. While the events of 1937 raise significant substantive
controversies, they also carry with them two main procedural re-
quests. First, the events of 1937 are more a declaration of pos-
sibilities than a definitive decree. They establish that the TJV is
no longer necessarily legitimate and that the DJV is no longer
119. It is a crisis that, regardless of its ultimate resolution, will be unsettling. Three
options are present, each of which is troublesome. First, if the orthodox theory is affirmed,
then the events of 1937 must be disaffirmed. Second, if the events of 1937 are accepted as
legitimate, a new form of liberalism must be worked out. Familiar theories and concepts
have to be discarded, and the difficult intellectual task that accompanies the development
of a new theory must be taken on armed only with the faith that such a new theory is
possible. Third, if there is no such faith, or if the new theories do not work, there is only
uncertainty. Old formulas no longer work and new formulas no longer can be created.
From the perspective of political philosophy, this final possibility may be the most unset-
tling of all. If taken to its limits, it implies that model building-the traditional mainstay of
political philosophy-has run its course. Political philosophy can only exist in the form of
an ad hoc existentialism, where decisions must be made but where no theory can be devel-
oped to justify the decisions other than the insights or intuitions of the moment. Thus,
regardless of which position ultimately prevails, a period of intellectual unrest must be
expected.
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necessarily illegitimate. This sets up an agenda for dialogue. The
dialogue must be about the TJV and DJV and it must be about
the concerns raised with respect to them in the context of the
events of 1937. However, so long as it is about these issues, it does
not have to give a particular, correct answer. Second, the events
of 1937 require dialogue. The three main areas of contro-
versy-legitimacy, transition, and boundaries-are complex, but
they are also questions that have to be talked about and decided.
Given these requirements, the Coase theorem plays an impor-
tant complementary role. One of the features of the theorem is
that it can be used to develop dialogue solely about the TJV or
solely about the DJV. In addition, however, it is obviously capable
of generating dialogue about both together, thus satisfying the
overall boundary concerns about the subject matter. This also
serves as a useful agenda-setting device that emphasizes the need
to consider the relationship between the two visions. The theorem
does not mandate that any particular result follows once the dia-
logue is initiated. Rather than predetermining a particular result,
it sets up a structure that makes sure the relevant questions are
asked.
Because of its structure, the theorem also forces the legal cul-
ture to talk about the nature of the two political visions and the
relationships between them. The theorem thus serves as a genera-
tor of dialogue. The theorem helps the legal culture to recognize
the existence of the two visions and their political assumptions. In
addition, as noted earlier, the theorem forces the legal culture to
confront some of the central substantive questions associated with
the DJV. What is equally important, however, is that the theorem
also requires answers. Because of its structure, the theorem also
forces the legal culture to give some response to it. For example,
before the theorem can be rejected outright, a normative argu-
ment must be generated that an end-state political structure is ille-
gitimate, either because it is politically unacceptable, 112 or because
it is conceptually infeasible.1 2 Even at this stage neutrality is not
possible because the theorem, as a political statement, also re-
quires a political rejection. Similarly, if the theorem is not re-
120. See, e.g., C. FRIED, supra note 2, at 81-107 (1978); Epstein, supra note 23.
121. See, e.g., Kelman, Ideology in the Coase Theorem, supra note 2.
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jected, the full agenda of issues it presents must be confronted. 2
The structure of the theorem requires the direct consideration of
the substantive nature of the DJV, such as, for example, wealth
distribution. In addition, it requires consideration of the tension
between the two visions. Finally, before the theorem can be imple-
mented, some decision about those issues must be made. The very
act of applying the theorem already implies that some type of
choice has been made. For example, to say that the theorem man-
dates the use of economic efficiency, already presupposes a host of
significant political assumptions. These assumptions range any-
where from the legitimacy of existing rights to the particular end-
state principle that should inform the DJV. a23
In each of these ways, therefore, the theorem serves an im-
portant procedural function by exposing the legal culture to the
types of controversies that arise out of the events of 1937. In this
respect the theorem is controversial not so much because of what
it says, but because of what it makes the legal culture do. Once
given the theorem, the legal culture is placed in the position of
being given the tools to confront some of the most difficult ques-
tions of political philosophy and then being required to use them.
What is equally significant and difficult for the legal culture, is
that lawyers can no longer claim that the law is autonomous. The
theorem can only be denied by recourse to normative political
philosophy and it can only be used by recourse to normative polit-
ical philosophy. There is no middle ground.
2. The Substantive Aspects of the Coase Theorem and the Events
of 1937. Because of the special relationship between the struc-
ture of the Coase theorem and the events of 1937, the theorem
serves as a special thought experiment about the problems of
modern political philosophy and therefore law. On the one hand,
the essence of the political events of 1937 is evident in the struc-
122. Of course, the considerations will not always be explicit; however, the important
point is that the use of the theorem necessarily carries with it a series of political choices
regardless of whether those choices are immediately obvious or not.
123. See, e.g., Coleman, Efficiency, supra note 98 (use of wealth maximization requires
assumptions about other instrumental goals, stipulation of initial entitlements, as well as
political justification of arguments based on hypothetical consent); Dworkin, Is Wealth a
Value?, 9 J. LEGAL SrUD. 191 (1980) (wealth maximization requires assumptions about initial
rights as well as instrumental goals); Kennedy, supra note 2 (economic efficiency yields in-
determinate results without a series of political decisions about initial entitlement as well
as general structure of society).
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ture of the theorem. On the other hand, the views of those in the
legal culture concerning the central substantive issues surround-
ing those events are evident in their treatment of the theorem.
The crisis and unease that dominate modern political philosophy
are consequently reflected in the way the legal culture deals with
the theorem. Because the essence of the political structure of the
events of 1937-the legitimacy of and relationship between the
TJV and the DJV-is captured in the Coase theorem, the theo-
rem performs a special proxy function: in reality much of the
commentary on the theorem is also commentary about some as-
pect of the events of 1937.
To illustrate this aspect of the theorem, two examples of the
proxy function will be discussed. The first is the general corre-
spondence between the political interpretation given the theorem
and the interpretation given the events of 1937. Because of the
close relationship between the structure of the theorem and the
events of 1937, the particular political meaning a person imputes
to the Coase theorem usually corresponds to the same meaning he
or she imputes to the events of 1937. Samples of the application
of this feature will be taken from several political perspectives.
The second is the correspondence between the criticism of the
Coase theorem and the controversies surrounding the events of
1937. Because of this proxy function much of the commentary on
the theorem also corresponds to commentary about some aspect
of the events of 1937. Rather than attempting a complete treat-
ment of how all the various controversies surrounding the events
of 1937 could be presented in discussion about the theorem, one
particularly prominent area-the treatment of rights in the theo-
rem-will be used to illustrate this aspect of the proxy function.
a. The Coase Theorem as Proxy-The Correspondence Between
the Interpretation of the Theorem and the Events of 1937. Both the
theorem and the events of 1937 require dialogue about the legiti-
macy of the DJV and its relationship to the TJV. Both require
answers to a similar set of political questions. While the events of
1937 present these issues writ large, the Coase theorem presents
many of these same issues writ small. Thus, it would be expected
that a legal scholar's interpretation of the legitimacy of the DJV
and the relationship between the DJV and the TJV in the context
of the Coase theorem would bear a close relationship to his or her
interpretation of those same questions when presented in the con-
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text of the events of 1937. Examples from the work of scholars of
several different political perspectives illustrate the workings of
the proxy function of the Coase theorem in this context.
One example is the work of Richard Epstein, one of the most
prominent conservative scholars. In some of his early work Ep-
stein attacked the Coase theorem as a politically unacceptable end-
state proposition."" In a series of articles and books he subse-
quently developed a theory of tort liability based on transactional
justice principles. 2 5 In some of his later work, Epstein expanded
his criticism of current doctrine beyond the area of tort liability to
aspects of modern constitutional law 2' and to labor regulation.
127
Significantly, Epstein's work on constitutional theory continues to
advocate 'many of the same TJV principles that dominated the
pre-1937 era of constitutional law and questions the legitimacy of
the use of the DJV in American law. By necessary implication, of
course, Epstein is advocating a restrictive interpretation of the
events of 1937. His initial rejection of the end-state elements of
the Coase theorem also served as a guide to his later rejection of
the use of the DJV in modern constitutional law.
Another example can be taken from the work of Bruce Ack-
erman, a political moderate. In contrast to Epstein, Ackerman un-
deniably supported the Coase theorem as a legitimate, if not nec-
essary, form of legal analysis.1 28 Ackerman's work in law and
economics and in legal theory clearly supported the use of the
theorem. 29 Consistent with his strong support of the DJV in the
context of the theorem, Ackerman's work in political philosophy
124. See Epstein, supra note 23.
125. See Epstein, Defenses and Subsequent Pleas in a System of Strict Liability, 3 J. LEGAL
STUD. 165 (1974); Epstein, Intentional Harms, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 391 (1975): Epstein, Nui-
sance Law, supra note 4: Epstein, Causation and Corrective Justice, supra note 4.
126. R. EP.srIN, TAKINGS, supra note 4: Epstein, The Case of Antitrust, supra note 4
(application of corrective justice to antitrust law): Epstein, Not Deference, But Doctrine: The
Eminent Domain Clause, 1982 Sup. GT REV. 351 (importance of compensation in kind and
dominant social standards in assessing validity of government regulation): Epstein, Taxation,
Regulation, and Confiscation, 20 OScOODE HALL LJ. 433 (1982) (limits on redistribution of
wealth by government).
127. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 947 (1984). See Ep-
stein, A Common Law for Labor Relations: A Critique of the New Deal Labor Legislation, 92 YALE
LJ. 1357 (1983) (contract paradigm in labor law).
128. B. AcKERMAN, supra note 2, at 46-71.
129. B. ACKERMAN, supra note 17, at 169, 271 n.3, 272 n.5; ECONOMIc FOUNDATIONS OF
PROPERTY LAW 17-24 (B. Ackerman ed. 1975).
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supported the legitimacy of a distributive justice form of liber-
alism.130 Similarly, his work in constitutional theory advocated
that the events of 1937 are unquestionably valid. 31 Thus, his ini-
tial interpretation of the validity of the DJV in the context of the
Coase theorem mirrored his later interpretation of those similar
issues in the context of the events of 1937.
A final example can be taken from the work of some of the
CLS scholars. One of the central themes of the CLS movement is
the "debunking of law and economics"132 and, along with it, the
Coase theorem.1 33 At first this may appear to be a paradox. While
the conservatives, such as Epstein, attack the theorem as a tool of
the leftists, the leftists attack the theorem as a tool of the conserv-
atives. After considering the position of the CLS movement on
the events of 1937, however, the reasons behind their rejection of
the theorem become clear. The political theorists and constitu-
tional scholars in the CLS mbvement stress the breakdown of lib-
eralism in the modern era. For the CLS scholars, the events of
1937 represent the further manifestation of the inherent inconsis-
tencies of liberal political theory rather than the movement away
from an unqualified acceptance of the TJV to a mixed system.'
CLS scholars associate orthodox liberal theory with both the TJV
of the Civil War-to-1937 period and with law and economics (and
consequently with the Coase theorem). They also argue that it
only sanctions politically repressive hierarchies and is no longer
130. See B. ACKERMAN, supra note 47. Ackerman announced at the outset that he is
proposing a theory of rights, based in neutral dialogue, that does not depend either on
social contract theory, or on an assumption that rights preexist the state. Id. at 4-6; see also
id. at 341-42. The concept of neutral dialogue is then used to develop a series of rights
about such things as access to material goods, education, and genetic diversity, see id. at 31-
227: as well as the role of the state, see id. at 231-324; see also infra note 139.
131. See Ackerman, supra note 55, at 1051-57.
132. Note, 'Round and 'Round the Bramble Bush: From Legal Realism to Critical Legal
Scholarship, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1680 n.75 (1982).
133. See, e.g., Horwitz, supra note 2; Kelman, Ideology in the Coase Theorem, supra note
2; Kennedy, supra note 2.
134. See, e.g., Kennedy, Toward An Historical Understanding of Legal Consciousness: The
Case of Classical Legal Thought in America, 1850-1940, in 3 Ras. L. & Soc 3, 5 (1980) (S.
Spitzer ed. 1980) ("we live . . . in a post-Classical age of disintegration"); Kennedy, Form
and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1713-37 (1976); Tushnet,
Darkness on the Edge of Town: The Contributions of John Hart Ely to Constitutional Theory, 89




intellectually defensible." 5 Thus, because the GLS scholars view
the TJV/DJV dichotomy in the events of 1937 as evidence of the
collapse of liberal theory, they also reject the Coase theorem. 3
These few examples do not exhaust the application of this
principle. However, they illustrate one aspect of the special con-
nections between the theorem and the events of 1937. Because
the theorem reflects the political structure of the events of 1937,
how legal scholars interpret the theorem may well symbolize their
interpretation of the legitimacy of those events.
b. The Coase Theorem as Proxy-Interpretation of the Theorem
as Reflective of the Controversies of Political Philosophy Surrounding the
Events of 1937. Another aspect of the proxy function of the
Coase theorem is that some of the controversies about it may be
related to some of the controversies of political philosophy sur-
rounding the events of 1937. Because of the similarities between
the political structure of the Coase theorem and the political
structure of the events of 1937, many of the most significant de-
bates about the Coase theorem among legal scholars merely echo
the important political themes that attach to those same questions
in the context of the events of 1937. To illustrate this aspect of
the theorem, one of the central questions in political philosophy
surrounding the events of 1937-the legitimacy of an end-state
version of liberalism-will be contrasted with some of the criti-
cism of the law and economics interpretation of the theorem. Fi-
nally, the application of the proxy function to some of the philo-
sophical controversies associated with the events of 1937 will also
be briefly considered.
i. The Coase Theorem as Reflective of the Substantive Problems
Associated with the Events of 1937-The Example of the Problem of a
Modern Theory of Rights. One of the central features of modern
political philosophy is the need to legitimate the DJV. While the
events of 1937 sanctioned the use of the DJV, they did not supply
a theory to justify it. In reaction, a central task of modern political
philosophers has been to supply a theoretical foundation for a dis-
135. See, e.g., Mensch, The History of Mainstream Legal Thought, in POLITICS OF LAW,
supra note 107, at 18, 36-37; Frug, The Language of Power (Book Review), 84 CoLuM. L.
REv. 1881, 1884-90 (1984); see also Mensch, Freedom of Contract as Ideology (Book Review),
33 STAN. L. REv. 753 (1981).
136. The fact that law and economics represents a conservative end-state theory is also
significant.
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tributive justice theory of liberalism. That is, one that would jus-
tify and direct such end-state goals as the redistribution of wealth,
regulation of the market, and alteration of the social structure,
but at the same time preserve the liberal tradition of individual
rights. Perhaps the most publicized effort so far has been John
Rawls' A Theory of Justice.137 Rawls was the first to propose a the-
ory of liberalism that responded to both the need for an end-state
vision and a particular concept of individual rights. 3 In addition,
Bruce Ackerman's work, Social Justice in the Liberal State,'39 can be
viewed as another attempt to develop a theory of liberalism that
would provide guidance for an activist state without sacrificing
protection of individual rights. 40
Not all end-state theories advocated were able to deal initially
with both of these DJV requirements. The most prominent exam-
ple is utilitarianism, along with its close variations of economic ef-
ficiency and wealth maximization. While these theories could eas-
ily supply the required end-state principle (i.e., maximize utility,
attain efficiency, or maximize wealth), they could not supply an
effective theory of rights. Each could provide a theory of when to
redistribute wealth, but none could supply, within its own frame-
work, a theory of rights against the state.141
137. J. RAWLS, supra note 46.
138. Several aspects of Rawis' theory are of particular significance here. First, it is
important to note that Rawls clearly abandons the orthodox social contract theory that
rights somehow preexist the state and that people therefore contract to protect them. In-
stead, he derives both his concept of rights and his concept of the state from his celebrated
hypothetical contract involving a "veil of ignorance." Id. at 118-92. Second, Rawls also
clearly presupposes the existence of an activist state as well as the need to assess critically
the legitimacy of the status quo with respect to such matters as the distribution of wealth,
access to power, and the social structure itself. See id. at 7, 54-117, 258-84.
139. B. ACKERMAN, supra note 47.
140. Ackerman also clearly rejects the traditional social contract theory as well as con-
ventional rights analysis. Id. at 4-6. Similarly, he also presupposes that the status quo is not
prima facie legitimate, id. at 4-5, and that the state (the "Commander" in Ackerman's
lexicon) plays an active role, id. at 24, 31-32. While Rawls used his hypothetical contract to
generate answers, Ackerman uses a theory of "restrained conversations," id. at 6-10, the
most important feature of which is his Neutrality principle, id. at 10-12.
141. For a general treatment of this problem of utilitarianism, see B. ACKERMAN, supra
note 47, at 342-45; J. RAWLS, supra note 46, at 22-27; Hart, Between Utility and Rights, 79
COLUM. L. REv. 828 (1979). Posner, of course, took great pains to distinguish wealth max-
imization from utilitarianism. See Posner, Wealth Maximization I, supra note 79. Rights, how-
ever, while they can be postulated, cannot be derived solely from the idea of wealth max-
imization. See, e.g., Dworkin, supra note 123, at 205-15. As a result, Posner could not
escape the problems of consequentialism either. See, e.g., Weinrib, supra note 31.
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Some leftist scholars attacked the entire enterprise. For these
theorists, orthodox talk of rights or liberalism was no longer use-
ful, since it yielded only politically repressive results and intellec-
tually incoherent arguments. 42 As a result, orthodoxy could no
longer be maintained. While some argued for a push beyond or-
thodoxy (perhaps to a form of superliberalism), 4 3 others urged a
withdrawal from orthodoxy and a retreat to the decentralized
structure of communal life.14 4
All of these theories have their adherents and their critics.
Similarly, no one perspective has clearly dominated. What is sig-
nificant, however, is not that some of these efforts may be incom-
plete or preliminary, but that all of them are part of an ongoing
dialogue in political philosophy that is ultimately linked to the
need to respond to the sanctioning of the DJV by the events of
1937.
With these considerations in mind, some of the controversy
associated with the theorem can be more readily understood. Be-
cause of the proxy function of the theorem, some of the same
controversies surrounding the DJV in the context of the events of
1937 should also be reflected in the treatment of the DJV in the
context of the Coase theorem. For example, a common criticism
of the law and economics interpretation of the theorem is that it
justifies results that deviate from acceptable moral norms. A com-
'mon reaction to the story about the rancher and the farmer (par-
ticularly among law students) is that the result generated by the
theorem is somehow morally wrong because it did not immedi-
ately label the conduct of the rancher's cows as wrong, and it may
even require that the farmer pay the rancher to have the actions
stopped. This same general criticism is present in many of the
other criticisms of the law and economics interpretation of the
theorem. Thus, it is sometimes said that the theorem fails to ac-
142. See, e.g., Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 TEX. L.
REV. 387 (1984); Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence from Bentham to
Hohfeld, 1982 Wis. L. REV. 975; Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEx. L. REV. 1363 (1984).
143. See Unger, supra note 134, at 602. See generally Hutchinson & Monahan, The
"Rights" Stuff: Roberto Unger and Beyond, 62 TEx. L. REV. 1477 (1984) (describing Unger's
vision of superliberalism).
144. See, e.g., Frug, The City as a Legal'Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1141-54 (1980)
(decentralized participatory democracy); see also Gabel, Book Review, 91 HARV. L. REV.
302, 315 (1977) ("an open and decentralized socialism that has yet to appear in developed
form anywhere in the world").
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commodate process rights,4 5 or noneconomic values;14 or that it
would justify moral monstrousness.4
Much of the controversy can be understood, instead, as a re-
flection of the inability of the DJV, within its own framework, to
generate a coherent theory of individual rights. When such moral
criticisms are made of the law and economics interpretation of the
theorem, they are merely a reflection of the larger controversy
surrounding the generation of a viable theory of liberalism in the
context of the events of 1937. Thus, even though initially di-
rected towards the Coase theorem, these moral criticisms are
more an indication of the reaction to the DJV political framework
that the theorem represents.
For example, an important aspect of the TJV is its concern
for personal autonomy. Contract and property rights, for exam-
ple, are premised on the inviolability of the individualand the im-
portance of personal choice. Under this framework, each person
exercises control over his or her own sphere of autonomy. These
spheres of autonomy, in turn, symbolize the separateness and im-
portance of each person. Each person controls when and under
what circumstances he or she bargains with others.
In contrast, in the DJV individual rights are collapsed into
end-state goals, with an attendant loss of personal autonomy. Due
145. See, e.g., Tribe, Technology Assessment and the Fourth Discontinuity: The Limits of In-
strumental Rationality, 46 S. CAL L. REv. 617, 630-41 (1973); see also Stewart, supra note 19,
at 1704-05 (preference shaping problem of economic analysis); Summers, Evaluating and
Improving Legal Processes-A Plea for "Process Values," 60 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1974) (general
plea for recognition of process values).
146. See, e.g., Rizzo, The Mirage of Efficiency, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 641, 643-48 (1980)
(general inability of economic analysis to deal with "moralisms"); see also Sagoff, Economic
Theory and Environmental Law, 79 MICH. L. REv. 1393 (1981) (economic analysis fails to
capture relevant policy concerns in environmental law).
147. See, e.g., Tribe, supra note 96, at 86-94. As even Posner has noted:
But there is probably more to notions of justice than a concern with effi-
ciency, at least in any obvious sense of the latter term. It is not obviously ineffi-
cient to permit people to enter into enforceable suicide pacts, to discriminate
on racial or religious grounds, or to eat the weakest passenger in the lifeboat in
circumstances of genuine desperation: nor is it obviously inefficient to permit
abortions, to allow babies to be sold for adoption, or to give convicted felons a
choice between imprisonment and participation in dangerous medical experi-
ments. Yet these are all practices frequently condemned as unjust. With regard
to them, the primary role of economic analysis would appear to be one of dis-
pelling certain pseudo-justice issues which seem to be based on sheer intellec-
tual confusion, and, even more important, to assist in value clarification. ...
R. POSNER, supra note 75, at 23 (footnotes omitted).
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to the need to implement end-state goals, the separateness of per-
sons can no longer be guaranteed. Physicalized spheres of control
no longer exist and individual will is no longer controlling. As a
result, property and contract rights are restricted. Persons no
longer have complete physical autonomy over their property, and
because of the assumption of cooperative bargaining, they no
longer have complete control over the bargains by which they are
bound. Within the framework of end-state goals, the separateness
of persons is no longer central.
Given this divergent treatment of rights in the two visions,
some of the reasons behind these attacks on the theorem can be
understood. Given the proxy function of the Coase theorem, dis-
cussion of the economic interpretation of the theorem must be
controversial. For traditional conservatives, the economic reading
of the theorem is politically and morally unacceptable because it
fails to give sufficient protection to individual autonomy and the
separateness of persons. 148 The theorem is controversial because it
represents a challenge to the very assumption about the nature of
rights in the TJV. Thus, for the conservatives, talk about morals
is a way to attack the DJV.
For liberals, the economic interpretation of the theorem is
controversial, but for a different reason. The liberals interpret the
theorem as exposing a weak point in a political theory they might
otherwise endorse and simultaneously presenting an end-state
principle they do not like. The liberals attack the law and eco-
nomics interpretation of the theorem as a way to defend the DJV
and as the first step toward developing a theory of the kind of
affirmative visions they want society to reflect. If rights can be
specified and the end-principles of efficiency attacked, then the
DJV is generally no longer as weak, and the threat of a conserva-
tive end-state principle can be countered. 4 9 Consequently, ques-
148. See, e.g., C. FRIED, supra note 2, at 81-107; Epstein, supra note 23, at 189-204
(1973); Fried, The Artificial Reason of the Law or: What Lawyers Know, 60 TEx. L. REv. 35
(198 1); see also Buchanan, Good Economics-Bad Law, 60 VA. L. REv. 483, 488-92 (1974) (use
of efficiency as standard for judges runs risk of inadequate protection of individual rights
because it conflates functions of Constitution, courts and legislatures); Epstein, A Taste for
Privacy? Evolution and the Emergence of a Naturalistic Ethic, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 665, 680 (1980)
("[Rlules that have to do with property, with aggression, and with family are intuitively
understood and justified for reasons that have nothing to do with some hidden social wel-
fare function.").
149. See, e.g., Dworkin, supra note 123, at 222-23.
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tioning the ability of the theorem to accommodate process rights
or declaring the moral monstrousness of various economic end-
state visions, and talking about the importance of personal auton-
omy and fulfillment are the mark of a continued faith in liber-
alism.15 When they argue that the law and economics interpreta-
tion of the Coase theorem is morally wrong, they are really
attempting to give specific form to an inarticulate political notion
that the DJV fails to grant sufficient individual rights to the
farmer.15 2 When they argue that the invasion of the rancher's
150. It is interesting to note the correspondence between the arguments made by lib-
erals against the theorem with the arguments they typically make when the political issues
are presented directly. Compare notes 149-52 and accompanying text with Stewart, Regula-
tion in a Liberal State: The Role of Non-Commodity Values, 92 YALE LJ. 1537 (1983).
151. See, e.g., Michelman, Norms and Normativity in the Economic Theory of Law, 62
MINN. L. REV. 1015, 1027-37 (1978). As Michelman expressed:
Sometimes there is a merely cursory effort to bring in noneconomic consid-
erations whose possible bearing is conceded pro forma. And sometimes these
considerations are just left for others to explore-philosophers, or maybe
poets, but not we hardheaded lawyers, not just this minute: we have mastered
economics (at least well enough to publish an economic analysis of this prob-
lem), but we can not fathom all that other spongy stuff.
It is true that we do not fathom the other stuff very well. We often cannot
talk about it very clearly: we do not see precisely how it works or grows; and
that, I guess, is one reason why it is just now being crowded out of the garden.
Normative economics is a far more polished, a far better articulated, a far more
accessible and presentable, a far better systemized body of analytical and critical
material, commanding far more internal disciplinary consensus than the rest of
moral and political theory. But from the fact that we find it hard to talk clearly
about the noneconomic normative bases of law, it does not follow that they are
not there or are not fundamental. I do not have a clear idea of the principles
underlying the warranty of habitability, though I can adumbrate them clumsily.
But I do know that the warranty of habitability is not a joke, is not a fable, is
not a law professor's fantasy or examination question. It is an authentic legal
event in the chronicles of the highest courts of too many American jurisdic-
tions-twelve, by count in 1975-to be dismissed as an aberration or a mistake.
Clarifying what its motivating principles are seems at least as important for
scholars wishing to stay in touch with actual law as demonstrating that eco-
nomic efficiency is not properly among them.
Id. at 1029-30 (footnote omitted). Even though he has been associated with conservatism
because of his use of economics, Calabresi has fully expressed his concern with the place of
"moralizing" in the law. See G. CAI.ABRSI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ArrITUDES, AND THE LAW 69-86
(1985) (issues of "moralisms" and emotions in torts); G. CALABRESI, supra note 37, at 24-26
(role of "justice" in accident law); G. CALABREST & P. BOBBTT, TRAGIC CHOICES 32 (1978)
(difficulty in pricing "moralisms"): Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 2, at 1111-15 (certain
fundamental moral entitlements such as freedom, are deemed inalienable even if the enti-
tlement holder wants to sell them because of the psychic effects of such a transaction on
other members of society): Calabresi, About Law and Economics: A Letter to Ronald Dworkin, 8
HoRFSrRA L. R -v. 553 (1980) (importance of rights to economic analysis). Even though other
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cows upon the farmer's land was wrong, they are really arguing
that personal responsibility and the recognition of the separate-
ness of persons are important features of rights even in the DJV.
When they argue that the rights of the farmer were violated, they
are actually arguing that the elements of personal control and
freedom, so evident in the TJV, have not been reflected in the
DJV. As a result, they conclude that the DJV presents a deficient
theory of individual rights.1"2
Finally, for CLS scholars the law and economics interpreta-
tion of the theorem is wrong because it symbolizes all that is
wrong with liberal political theory and with law and economics.
They contend it is wrong because it symbolizes the incoherency of
liberal thought,153 it fails to generate a theory of individual
rights,'" and it represents a conservative end-state view.a r
ii. The Coase Theorem as Proxy for the Transition and Bound-
ary Controversies Associated with the Events of 1937-Selected Exam-
ples. The proxy function is not limited to the law and economics
interpretation of the theorem. The influence of the correspon-
dence between the political structure of modern political theory
and the Coase theorem is evident in other areas as well. When
lawyers are presented with the theorem, they usually sense a con-
flict between what their professional intuitions suggest and what
the standards of the theorem require. Much of this tension, how-
ever, can be attributed to the reflection of the transition and
liberals have criticized his approach as not giving enough elaboration of a theory of rights,
see, e.g., Dworkin, Why Effidency?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 563 (1980), his approach is far more
sympathetic to liberal values than Posner, a person with whom he is often grouped.
152. See, e.g., C. FRIED, supra note 2, at 81-107 (1978) (economic analysis diminishes
the concept of person), Baker, supra note 96, at 39-41 (1975) (economic theory fails to
respect autonomy and dignity of persons), Tribe, supra note 97, at 86-97 (individual pref-
erences cannot be expressed as simple summations of the total bundle of goods the individ-
ual enjoys). see also Baker, supra, at 9-32 (favors rich over poor).
153. See, e.g., Heller, The Importance of Normative Decisionmaking: The Limitations of Legal
Economics as a Basis for Liberal Jurisprudence-As Illustrated by the Regulation of Vacation
Home Development, 1976 Wis. L. REV. 385, 468-500; see also Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2 J.
LEGAL STuD. 351, 352 (1973) (proposes concept of legal formality to link Lockean con-
tractarian political doctrine, legal positivism, and welfare economic analysis under single
treatment of liberalism).
154. See, e.g., Mensch, The History of Mainstream Legal Thought, in POLITICS OF LAW,
supra note 107, at 18, 36-37; Note, Two Models of Law and Economics, supra note 31, at 978.
155. See, e.g., Horwitz, supra note 2; Kelman, Spitzer and Hoffman on Coase: A Brief
Rejoinder, 53 S. CAL L. REV. 1215, 1222 (1980):
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boundary controversies associated with the events of 1937.15 For
example, when lawyers sense a conflict between the application of
conventional legal concepts of torts and property and what the
economic interpretation of the theorem requires, they are also
recognizing the tension between the TJV and the DJV, and are
beginning to talk about what the relationship between them
should be.157 Similarly, when they sense a conflict between what
they were trained to perceive as the existing rights of the farmer
to use his land and the seemingly prospective rearrangement of
those rights by the Coase theorem, they are beginning to deal
with some of the controversies surrounding the transition from
the TJV to a mixed system.15
Some of the reaction to the Coase theorem also reflects the
influence of the boundary controversies involving the interaction
of the TJV and the DJV.1 59 For example, the reaction of the legal
culture to the theorem typically depends on the subject matter
and the persons that are used to illustrate its operation. If in the
facts of the Coase theorem corporations are substituted for the
rancher and farmer, or if entitlements about pollution rights are
substituted for entitlements about husbandry,60 the theorem be-
156. See supra text accompanying notes 49-81.
157. I have noticed that beginning second-year law students almost universally per-
ceive the theorem as deviant. Much of the reason for this is that the conceptual framework
they are given in their first-year courses in torts and property is almost entirely based on
classical common-law thought. As a result, the students have already implicitly accepted the
IJV as the relevant standard of proper legal argument. Once exposed to the politics of the
theorem, however, the dialogue tends to gravitate in one fashion or another to one of the
legitimacy controversies associated with the events of 1937.
158. For example, common questions from my students are whether the farmer pos-
sessed this right previously, and if so, what status it had; or alternatively, whether the theo-
rem applies without respect to any existing rights.
159. See supra Section Ill(C).
160. Application of Coasean principles in environmental legislation involving either
intraplant or interplant trading between sophisticated bargainers is far less controversial.
than some of its other applications. See, e.g., Comment, Increment Allocation Under Prevention
of Significant Deterioration: How to Decide Who is Allowed to Pollute, 74 Nw. U.L. REv. 936
(1980); Note, Emission-Offset Banking: Accommodating Industrial Growth with Air-Quality Stan-
dards, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 937 (1980). In this respect, it is also interesting to note that the"
theorem has made far greater inroads into such regulatory areas as environmental law than
into many traditional common-law areas. Nearly every contemporary environmental law
textbook deals with the Coase theorem. See F. ANDERSON, D. MANDELKER & A. TARLOCK,
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTE(TION: LAW AND POLICY 31-32 (1984); 1R FINDLEY & D. FARBER, ENVI-
RONMENTAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 226-30 (2d ed. 1985); T. SCHOENBAuM, ENVIRON-
MENTAl. PoLicy LAW: CASES, READINGS, AND TEXT 27-30 (1985); R. STEWART & J. KRIER,
supra note 36, at 119-33.
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comes generally acceptable to the legal culture. In contrast, if the
facts involved entitlement to steal,161 or a relationship between a
parent and a minor child, the theorem probably would be unac-
ceptable. What this change of persons and activities illustrates is
simply a concern over the boundaries of the TJV and DJV. While
the DJV typically is more acceptable for entitlements capable of
sophisticated negotiation and for economic regulation, it also is
perceived as less acceptable for many of the day-to-day activities
of ordinary people,6 2 or for matters such as crime. This simply
illustrates another application of the proxy function of the theo-
rem. When people are arguing about the application of the theo-
rem to such different areas, they are really arguing about which
areas are best suited to the DJV and which are not.
Similarly, the reaction of the legal culture to the Coase theo-
rem also reflects the tension involved in the coordination of the
two visions.1' Commentators have frequently dealt with the con-
troversies raised by the treatment of cause in the Coase theo-
rem.1 64 Much of this controversy, however, is actually about the
161. See, e.g., Hoppe, A License to Steal, San Francisco Chron., Feb. 8, 1971, at 39, col.
5, reprinted in EcONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAW 49 (B. Ackerman ed. 1975); see
also Weinrib, The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE L.J. 247, 249-50 (1980) (Coasean treat-
ment of cause and duty to rescue). 'The DJV certainly has had some impact on the adminis-
tration of the criminal laws, see, e.g., R. POSNER, supra note 75, at 163-77; Becker, Crime and
Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. PoL ECON. 169 (1968): Polinsky & Shavell, The
Optimal Tradeoff Between the Probability and Magnitude of Fines, 69 AM. ECON. REv. 880
(1979). However, when economic analysis is used to determine whether such basic acts
such as theft should be declared crimes, it has a less authoritative ring to it. See, e.g., Cala-
bresi & Melamed, supra note 2, at 1124-47. I doubt whether even some of the most com-
mitted proponents of economic analysis would argue that the Coasean assumption of reci-
procity would control if the dispute between the rancher and the farmer involved an
entitlement to murder. A prominent symbol of this clash between an overall theory of
administration and individual responsibility has been Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966).
162. See, e.g., Campisano, supra note 76, at 818-32 (argues that business taxpayers
should be treated differently than individual taxpayers because of different normative
considerations).
163. See supra text accompanying notes 74-81.
164. See, e.g., Borgo, Causal Paradigms in Tort Law, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 419 (1979); Cala-
bresi, supra note 77; Epstein, Causation and Corrective Justice, supra note 4: Epstein, supra
note 23, at 160-89; Gjerdingen, supra note 3, at 719-20, 726-27; Grady, Proximate Cause
and the Law of Negligence, 69 IOWA L. REV. 363 (1984); Landes & Posner, Causation in Tort
Law: An Economic Approach, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 109 (1983); Posner, Epstein's Tort Theory: A
Critique, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 457 (1979); Rizzo, The Imputatidn Theory of Proximate Cause: An
Economic Framework, 15 GA. L. REv. 1007 (1981); Shavell, An Analysis of Causation and the
Scope of Liability in the Law of Torts, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 463 (1980). Good introductions to the
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coordination of the TJV and DJV. Cause is an essential aspect of
liability in the TJV.1 6 In contrast, in the DJV cause is important
only insofar as it provides relevant information for specific. end-
state goals. 66 For Calabresi, who adopts a Coasean perspective,
cause is therefore subordinated to other end-state goals, such as
loss spreading, distributional equity, specific deterrence and gen-
eral deterrence. 167 As a result, Calabresi is concerned about such
concepts as "causal link." ' 8 Similarly, adherents of other end-
state standards also use this notion of causation.1 69 On one level,
the causation debate reflects a tension between the TJV and the
DJV.170 In terms of the TJV/DJV dichotomy posed in this Arti-
cle, this presents a classic boundary problem. Actual or intuitive
causation is a central feature of the TJV, yet probabilistic cause or
causal link is a feature of the DJV. Therefore, part of the ration-
ale behind the choice of concepts must be linked to a political
preference for one vision over the other. On another level, how-
ever, the debate reflects an effort to utilize existing TJV concepts
for the purpose of fulfilling a DJV goal and thus coordinating the
two systems. 71 That effort merely reflects the larger problems of
coordinating the TJV and DJV.
area are found in Bush, supra note 51, and Wright, supra note 74.
165. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 23, at 165-89. As Epstein notes, "[F]or most persons,
the difficult question is often not whether these causal assertions create the presumption
lof liabilityl, but whether there are in fact any means to distinguish between causation and
responsibility, so close is the connection between what a man does and what he is answera-
ble for." Id. at 169: see also Horwitz, The Doctrine of Objective Causation, in POLrrIcs OF LAW,
supra note 107, at 201 (doctrine of objective causation an essential part of a system of
nonredistributive private law).
166. See, e.g., Gjerdingen, supra note 3, at 726-27.
167. See Calabresi, supra note 77, at 73-91.
168. Id. at 71-72.
169. See, e.g., Landes & Posner, supra note 164: Shavell, supra note 164 (probabilistic
cause and instrumentalist approach).
170. While I am not certain whether Richard Wright would draw the same conclu-
sion, his recent article on causation, in my view, provides a good example of this tension
between the two political perspectives. See Wright, supra note 74. The clearest statement of
the political issues is Bush, supra note 51.
171. Particularly good examples of this phenomenon are Calabresi, supra note 77
(adapting "lJV notions of "but for" and "proximate cause" to use in a DJV format); Rizzo,
supra note 164, at 1037 (argues "that traditional deterministic ideas of causation are simply
special cases of a more general probabilistic analysis"); Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in
Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARv. L. REv. 849 (1984)
(proposal to graft some DJV aspects of tort law onto TJV framework to deal with problems
of toxic torts). See generally Bush, supra note 51 (attempts to resolve problem by proposing




The Coase theorem is many things. It is a proposition about
economic efficiency and it is a proposition about law and econom-
ics. In addition, I have argued that it is a thought experiment of
special importance to the legal culture, and that it carries with it a
distributive justice political structure. Once the nature of that
structure is understood and the theorem is viewed as something
more than law and economics, many of the reasons behind its con-
troversy can be discerned.
The Coase theorem is a political structure. It carries with it
the political presuppositions of the DJV; it draws attention to the
absence of the TJV; and, as a result, it also carries with it the
essence of the political conflict surrounding the events of 1937.
As a political statement it requires a political response. The theo-
rem can be understood only after the politics of the TJV and the
DJV are comprehended and only after the influence of those po-
litical structures on the legal culture is understood.
The Coase theorem is a thought experiment. It can be used
to begin to talk on a small scale about issues that might over-
whelm us if talked about on a large scale. It can help us talk about
the source of the legal culture, its current status, its direction, and
whether or not such direction is warranted. But if it is a way into
the controversy, it is also a way out of the controversy. The struc-
ture of the theorem forces those who must deal with it to deal
with questions that it raises. It does not just ask questions, but it
also structures the dialogue to begin to develop some answers.
The Coase theorem is a story about the "death of the com-
mon law."172 It challenges the political foundations of common
law thought, it challenges its reliance on intuitional thought,17 3
and it challenges its reliance on common-law categories. It also
challenges the conventional assumptions about the autonomy of
the law.
The Coase theorem is a story about the birth of modern
politics. It reflects the problems of its legitimacy and the uncer-
tainty of its future. It also begins to question the role of the legal
culture in that future.
Thus, the Coase theorem is controversial not because it is
172. See Gjerdingen, supra note 3, at 758-60.
173. See Gjerdingen, supra note 3.
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about law and economics, but because it is not only about law and
economics. It is controversial not because it is about politics, but
because it is about law and politics. And it is controversial not be-
cause it is something alien to the law, but because, if anything, it
tells us too much about it. That may be the most controversial
point of all.

